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Kesäkuussa 2016 järjestetty kansanäänestys Ison-Britannian EU –jäsenyydestä johti maan 
eroon Euroopan unionista. Tapahtuman poliittiset vaikutukset ovat olleet mittavat ja syitä 
äänestyksen tulokselle on etsitty monesta paikasta. Tämä Englannin kielen ja kirjallisuuden pro 
gradu –tutkielma tutkii retoriikkaa, jota Britannian pääministerit ovat käyttäneet puhuessaan maansa 
suhteista Euroopan unioniin. Analyysin keskiössä on konservatiivipääministeri David Cameronin 
(2010-2016) ”Bloomberg”-puhe, jossa hän julkisti aikeensa järjestää kansanäänestys Britannian 
EU-jäsenyydestä.  
Tutkielma jäljittää Britannian EU –jäsenyyden narratiivista historiaa ja tutkii kuinka tämä 
historia, ja sen aikana rakennettu tarina Britanniasta vastentahtoisena jäsenenä, vaikuttaa Cameronin 
puheeseen ja hänen argumentaatioonsa. Analyysin tukena on Oliver Daddow:n 
teoria ”ulkopuolisuuden perinteestä” (Outsider Tradition), jota on luotu ja ylläpidetty poliittisien 
puheiden voimalla. Perinne sisältää uskomuksia Britannian kansallisidentiteetistä, historiasta sekä 
politiikasta, ja on syntynyt auttamaan maata sovittamaan itsenäisyytensä ja ainutlaatuisuutensa 
yhteen monikansallisen unionin jäsenyyden kanssa. Tutkielma esittelee ulkopuolisuuden 
perinteeseen nojaavan kertomuksen (narrative) kehittymistä pääministereiden puheissa Margaret 
Thatcherista (1979–1990) Gordon Browniin (2005–2010), asettaen Cameronin puheen tähän 
kontekstiin retorisen tilanteen teorian kautta.  
Retorisella tilanteella tarkoitetaan retorista tekoa ympäröivää tilannetta. Retorinen tilanne 
koostuu neljästä komponentista: syy retoriselle teolle (exigence), puhuja (rhetor), yleisö (audience) 
ja rajoitukset (constraints). Tutkielma tarkastelee Cameronin luomaa retorista tilannetta eri 
komponenttien osalta ja arvioi niiden vaikuttavuutta ottaen huomioon aiempien pääministerien 
rakentaman kertomuksen.  
David Cameronin ”Bloomberg” –puhe ammentaa paljon etenkin konservatiivipääministerien 
puheista, vahvistaen ulkopuolisuuden kertomusta. Cameronin puhe osoittaa kertomuksen sisäisen 
ristiriidan. Vaikka Cameron esittää Britannian vastentahtoisena EU-jäsenenä, joka vastustaa 
syvempää integraatiota, eikä halua menettää itsemääräämisoikeuttaan keskeltä hallitulle unionille, 
hän silti vakuuttaa Briteille, että EU:sta lähteminen olisi suuri virhe. Ulkopuolisuuden perinne on 
ollut tasapainoilua kansallisten myyttien ja tosielämän tarpeiden välillä. Cameronin argumentaatio 
ja hänen luomansa retorinen tilanne jatkavat tätä nuoralla tanssimista. Puheen retorinen tilanne on 
kaikkien komponenttien osalta ristiriitainen, sillä se perustuu kertomukseen, joka on luonut 
Britannialle roolin EU:sta aina hieman erillään olevana maana. Tämä kertomus kulminoituu 
Britannian EU-eroon ja sen vaikutus kansanäänestyksen tulokseen on nähtävissä tutkielman 
analyysissä.  
 
Avainsanat: retorinen tilanne; Outsider Tradition; kertomus; Iso-Britannia; Euroopan unioni; 
Brexit; David Cameron.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron (2010–2016) will undoubtedly go down in history as a gambler: a 
man who bet twice on the future of the United Kingdom, won the first time and lost everything on 
the second round. Cameron presided over two referendums that had the potential to permanently 
alter the makeup and position of the UK: the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 (there was 
major pressure to hold a referendum brought on by the electoral success of the pro-independence 
Scottish National Party who had achieved an overall majority in the Scottish Parliamentary 
elections in 2011 (Carrell “Stunning SNP election victory”)), and the referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the European Union in 2016. The Prime Minister campaigned for “remain” during 
both referendums. How much his powers of persuasion influenced the decision of Scottish people to 
vote “no” to independence is arguable, but in the case of the EU-referendum, Cameron failed to 
convince the British electorate to vote remain.  
Nearly 52% of voters did not heed the advice of the prime minister and voted to leave the 
European Union. The unexpected outcome plunged the UK into political turmoil and prompted 
Cameron’s resignation. The reasons behind the leave-vote are numerous and complicated. One key 
element can be identified: the way the EU-UK relationship has been portrayed in public discourse. 
The kinds of narratives that have been put forth by public figures such as politicians, have had a 
major impact on the public perception of the EU and Britain’s relationship with it. The rhetoric used 
in discussions about the EU in the UK has informed (and misinformed) the public since Britain 
joined the European Economic Community in 1973. This thesis will trace the narrative history of 
how Britain’s relationship has been presented in the rhetoric of past UK prime ministers, and use 
this to analyse David Cameron’s speech about Britain’s future in the European Union, given at 
Bloomberg on January 23, 2013 in which he promises to hold a referendum on Britain’s 
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membership of the EU. This thesis also uses theory on rhetorical situations to examine Cameron’s 
rhetoric; its main features, style, and effectiveness.   
Rhetoric is the art of persuasion; an utterance constitutes as a rhetorical act only when its 
purpose is to have an impact on an audience. No rhetorical act, however, exists in a vacuum. Lloyd 
F. Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation as a problem or a question that is looking for an answer in a 
form of a rhetorical act, a speech, an address and so forth. Bitzer argues that rhetoric is always 
situational: it has a context, a certain reality to which the rhetorical act corresponds. Critics disagree 
on whether a rhetorical situation is an objective fact, as Bitzer argues, or whether the rhetor creates 
the situation in and during the rhetorical act, as Richard Vatz argues. Many critics assert that a 
rhetorical situation is a certain objective reality, but the rhetor chooses which aspects of the reality 
to “give salience to” (Vatz 158).  
This thesis takes the view on theory that the rhetor does choose what issues to address and 
how, and thereby does more than identify a correct problem to which to answer, as Bitzer suggests. 
This view underlines the role of the rhetor in crafting a situation, thereby placing the responsibility 
for the discourse on him. The issue of responsibility is especially important when analysing political 
speech. This thesis argues that the seeds for Brexit were sown in speeches made by British 
politicians, so to present them as mere observers of an objective reality would be disingenuous.  
However, this thesis also recognizes the fact that a rhetorical act, such as a political speech, 
alone cannot solve the discourse. This thesis traces a narrative history of how the UK’s relationship 
with the EU has been represented in speeches by UK prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to 
David Cameron, using as foundation Oliver Daddow’s theory on the Outsider Tradition. The 
Outsider Tradition refers to a tradition of Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe and how 
Britain has viewed itself as an outsider to the European community, and taken concrete steps to 
emphasize its position as an outsider. So, while Cameron bears responsibility for his rhetoric and its 
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effectiveness, there are elements in the larger discourse that affect the rhetorical situation of the 
speech.  
This thesis analyses the rhetorical situation of David Cameron’s speech utilizing theory on 
the components of a rhetorical situation: the exigence (the reason for the speech; the problem to be 
answered), the rhetor (how Cameron presents himself), the audience(s) (what roles he assigns to the 
two core audiences: EU leaders and the British public), and the constraints (what limit what can be 
said). This thesis also looks at how the rhetorical situation of Cameron’s speech corresponds to or 
clashes with the previous narratives put forth by his predecessors1 in their political speeches, i.e. the 
Outsider Tradition. The tracing of a rhetorical history of Britain’s relationship with the European 
Union provides a context for Cameron’s speech and explains many of the rhetorical choices he 
makes. This thesis argues that Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech draws from a narrative of Britain as 
an outsider to the EU which has been referenced in countless speeches by previous prime ministers, 
particularly by those in Cameron’s own party, the Conservatives.  
 
 
1.1. Primary Materials 
 
 
David Cameron’s speech at Bloomberg on January 23, 2013 is one that sowed the seed for Brexit, 
as Cameron sets out his plan to hold an in-out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU if the 
Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 general election.  
Cameron starts the speech by identifying problems in the EU and articulates his concerns for 
the future of the Union. The bulk of the speech is Cameron’s analysis about his five principles for 
reforming the EU: competitiveness, flexibility, devolution of power (away from the EU, back to the 
                                                 
1 Margaret Thatcher, Con. (1979-1990); John Major, Con. (1990-1997); Tony Blair, Lab. (1997-2007), Gordon Brown, 
Lab. (2007-2010) 
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member states), democratic accountability, and fairness. Cameron then states his intention to 
negotiate these reforms with the EU and put the question of Britain’s EU-membership to the people. 
The last quarter of the speech is spent making the argument for remaining in the EU, despite 
Cameron’s earlier protestations about the EU’s many flaws.  
Early in the speech Cameron defines the context into which he sets his speech, the spirit in 
which he approaches the issues: a Europe united after a tumultuous and violent past and in it, a 
Britain whose “island nation” mentality causes it to view the EU with suspicion. Cameron casts 
himself in the role of a maverick who bravely asks questions the EU does not necessarily want to 
hear. Two separate audiences are identified in the speech: the EU-leaders and the British electorate, 
both of which Cameron addresses directly, asking them to listen to his proposals and heed his 
advice.  
The “Bloomberg” speech is included in the Appendix of this thesis. When the speech is 
quoted in the thesis, it is referred to by the page numbers found in the appendix (pages 1-14). The 
source for my transcript of the speech is the official government website 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg) and the BBC transcript 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21160684). The reason for combining the two sources is that 
the government transcript has removed references to “political content”, namely discussion about 
the referendum and the Conservative manifesto. The BBC transcript includes the full text but does 
not contain the titles for each chapter found in the written version of the speech. The transcript 
found in the Appendix includes the whole text of the speech and the titles. Both sources are cited in 
the Bibliography; they have different titles but contain the same speech.  
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1.2. Secondary Materials 
 
 
This thesis uses theory on rhetorical situations as a tool to analyse Cameron’s speech. As mentioned 
earlier, different critics have interpreted the rhetor’s role in creating or defining a rhetorical 
situation differently.  
Lloyd F. Bitzer introduced the concept of rhetorical situation in the late 1960s, proposing 
that all rhetoric is situational and that the situation prompts a question or problem to which the 
rhetorical act is an answer. Bitzer argues that we should not assume that “a rhetorical address gives 
existence to the situation; on the contrary, it is the situation which calls the discourse into existence” 
(Bitzer 2). To Bitzer the situation is what it is, and how well the rhetorical act succeeds in its goal of 
persuasion, depends on how well the rhetor identifies the true situation (3). According to Bitzer “the 
work of rhetoric is pragmatic”; it responds to a certain need, for example to an event that requires a 
certain kind of response (2).2  
Bitzer’s analysis posits that the rhetor is someone who needs to correctly identify an 
objective reality and respond to it accordingly. This view sees reality as a collection of objective 
facts, not as something that is actively created through language. Richard E. Vatz criticises 
precisely this point and counters Bitzer, arguing that: “No situation can have a nature independent 
of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to 
characterize it” (Vatz 154). Vatz takes the view that reality is constructed in rhetorical acts, and 
while Vatz agrees with Bitzer that all rhetoric is situational, that situation is largely created by the 
rhetor (156). The rhetor chooses which aspect of reality to focus on, which of them to “give salience 
to”, as Vatz puts it (158).  
                                                 
2 Bitzer uses the example of the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy in 1963 as a rhetorical situation to 
which the new president Lyndon Johnson had to respond. Bitzer argues that this type of situation required a specific 
type of rhetorical act in response (Bitzer 8-9) 
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This thesis recognizes Vatz’s assertion that, contrary to what Bitzer argues, the success of a 
rhetorical act is not dependent on the rhetor simply correctly identifying a problem or a question 
and then responding to it (Vatz, 158). Vatz’s theory places the responsibility for the rhetorical 
situation on the rhetor, and is therefore appropriate for analysis of political speech, where words can 
shape people’s perceptions. What one can, however, take from Bitzer, with regard to the very nature 
of a rhetorical situation, is that even though the rhetor chooses how he addresses the situation, there 
are issues that affect the persuasiveness of his rhetoric. This thesis contains discussion on the 
previous narratives about the EU’s and Britain’s relationship which have been put forth by British 
prime ministers. In order to understand why Cameron makes the rhetorical choices he does in his 
speech, even though they sometimes create a confusing or even contradictory picture, we must look 
at the wider context into which the speech is born. The “Bloomberg” speech does not exist in a 
vacuum. It is merely one link in the long chain of EU-speeches by British prime ministers. Even if 
Cameron does not directly acknowledge the words of his predecessors, they still have an impact on 
his speech. The objective of this thesis is to track a narrative of Britain as an outsider to the EU 
(what Oliver Daddow call the “Outsider Tradition”; OT for short) and analyse how Cameron draws 
from, diverts from, or builds on this narrative.  
Bitzer’s writings form the core methodology used in this thesis. In his essay about rhetorical 
situations, Bitzer identifies three constituents of a rhetorical situation: exigence, audience, and 
constraints (Bitzer 6).  
Exigence refers to the reason for performing the rhetorical act. It is “a defect, an obstacle, 
something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (6). According to the view 
of this thesis, the rhetor creates the exigence themselves: for example, Cameron starts his speech by 
stating: “This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe” (Cameron 1), indicating that the 
reason for the speech is his own desire to take action, not an event that requires an urgent response, 
as Bitzer would argue. This opening by Cameron also says much about how he wishes to present 
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himself. Right from the outset, Cameron portrays himself as someone taking action to enact 
meaningful change. This passage therefore also concerns a constituent not included in Bitzer’s 
original grouping but added later by Keith Grant-Davie: the rhetor (Grant-Davie 272). How the 
rhetor is viewed and thought about has an impact on the rhetorical act. This constituent, like the 
other three, is partly predetermined but largely open to definition and reinterpretation (269). The 
reason this thesis includes this constituent is because the role Cameron assigns himself in his speech 
does affect his message and does create the context for the speech. It also affects how well the 
intended audiences identify with Cameron and heed his advice. 
The second constituent in Bitzer’s theory is audience. Bitzer distinguishes a general 
understanding of an audience, meaning all persons who might hear or read the rhetorical act from a 
rhetorical audience, meaning: “persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of 
being mediators of change” (Bitzer, 7, italics mine). The audience in a rhetorical situation are those 
who can be influenced through rhetoric, and have the power to act on that influence. Cameron 
identifies, and directly addresses, two different audiences in his speech: the EU-leaders and the 
British public.3 Both audiences fulfill the role of Bitzer’s rhetorical audience as they have the power 
to enact the changes Cameron is asking for. This thesis will discuss what kinds of tools Cameron’s 
speech uses to appeal to these two audiences and how successful these tools are, in light of the 
outcome of Cameron’s negotiation with the EU and the results of the British referendum. 
Bitzer’s third constituent of a rhetorical situation is constraints. Constraints are “beliefs, 
attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives” that limit the rhetor and guide his 
rhetorical act to a certain direction (8). Keith Grant-Davie, argues that constraints are also used by 
the rhetor to their advantage (Grant-Davie 272), and this is also the view taken by Bitzer. An 
example of the use of constraints to aid one’s cause in Cameron’s speech is his use of the 
mythology of Britain as a proud, independent “island nation” to argue against further European 
                                                 
3 How Cameron constructs and addresses the two audiences is discussed in chapter 3.4.1. 
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political integration. The idea of Britishness characterized as physical separation from the rest of 
Europe can be harnessed to mean that any deepening of ties with the EU, be they economic, cultural 
etc., is a decrease in British sovereignty. The speeches by previous PMs also constrain what can be 
said by the Cameron. The strong Eurosceptic streak in particularly the Conservative tradition, limits 
what Cameron can do.  
This thesis also utilizes Aristotelian theory on rhetoric with its four methods of persuasion: 
the influence of the speaker, the subject matter, appeals to the emotions of the audience, and the 
stylistic techniques of the speaker (Kinneavy 237). These issues are discussed in chapters 3.3., 3.4., 
and 3.5. 
 
 
1.3. Results and Further Study 
 
 
This thesis argues that Cameron builds on the narrative of “Britain as an outsider” in the European 
Union. This narrative has had a strong presence in the speeches of former British prime ministers 
and it has been the defining characteristic in depictions of Britain’s relationship with the EU. The 
context into which Cameron places his speech is one where there is something deeply wrong with 
the direction the EU is heading and the British people are deeply unsatisfied with their current 
relationship with the EU. In his speech Cameron offers solutions to the problems that he identifies 
as most crucial. These include resisting further integration, devolving power back to member states, 
and making the EU more democratic. Cameron appeals directly to the EU leaders to adopt these 
changes and then puts the question to the British people, arguing that they should vote to stay in a 
reformed European Union.      
This thesis proposes that the rhetorical situation Cameron creates, while being in line with 
previous narratives by British prime ministers, is not cohesive, makes too many generalisations and 
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simplifications, and is internally contradictory. The main issue with the speech is Cameron’s 
pointing out all the ways in which the European Union does not work for Britain and then arguing 
that it would be unwise for Britain to leave the EU. The choices Cameron makes in crafting the 
rhetorical situation for his speech create a confused picture of what the UK’s relationship with the 
EU is and what it should be. Cameron’s balancing act between contrasting claims to appeal to 
different audiences weakens his ability to effectively argue for Britain to remain in the EU, and can 
be seen as having had an influence on his failure to win the referendum he himself brought into 
existence. 
This thesis adds to the study of political rhetoric and its impact on the way we perceive 
political realities. Given the freshness and the ever-changing nature of Brexit, its causes have been 
discussed widely, but not studied extensively. This thesis seeks to understand the role David 
Cameron’s rhetoric played in tipping the scales towards the leave-vote winning, and what impact 
the “Bloomberg” speech might have had on his inability to persuade the British electorate to vote 
“remain” during the referendum campaign. The findings of this thesis can increase our 
understanding of why such a seismic change in British politics and society took place.  
One contributing factor to Brexit and general negative attitudes to the EU that is not 
discussed in this thesis is the history and legacy of the British Empire and its impact on national 
myths. The effect of an imperial past on identity and on a particular brand on English nationalism4 
as a contributing cause for the Brexit vote has been examined in several articles in the wake of the 
referendum result.5 Many opinion pieces have also argued that Brexit will allow Britain to 
strengthen its ties to the Commonwealth.6 
                                                 
4 The concept of English nationalism and the impact of national identity on attitudes towards the European Union is 
discussed in chapter 2.5. 
5 Younge 2018; Thahoor 2017; Tomlinson & Dorling 2016 
6 The Commonwealth of Nations consists mostly of former territories of the British Empire 
(http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries). Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth after Brexit discussed 
for example in Blitz 2018, Charamba 2018, MacLeod 2016, and Sippit 2017. 
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The rhetoric used in the EU-referendum campaign by both sides could be another object for 
further study. To see what impact the Outsider Tradition had on the political speeches and 
statements given during the campaign would deepen our understanding of this longstanding 
narrative and connect the referendum results to a history of rhetoric.  
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2. Britain as an Outsider 
 
 
This chapter introduces the Outsider Tradition (referred to as “the OT” from now on) that forms the 
foundation for David Cameron’s EU-speech. Later in the thesis, I will argue that Cameron’s 
rhetoric draws heavily from this narrative and is thus another link in the chain of EU-speeches by 
British prime ministers. The theoretical elements of this chapter are derived from a 2015 article by 
Oliver Daddow: “Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy Speeches from 
Thatcher to Cameron”. The article traces what Daddow identifies as the Outsider Tradition 
regarding Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe from the 1800s to present day. Cary Fontana 
and Craig Parsons have outlined four political traditions that have had an impact on British political 
discourse on the subject of the European Union. Their article “‘One Woman's Prejudice’: Did 
Margaret Thatcher Cause Britain's Anti‐Europeanism?” focuses especially on Conservative Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s contribution to the hardening of rhetoric about the EU. The Fontana 
and Parsons article serves as the other theoretical pillar of this chapter.  
This chapter includes analysis of speeches by British prime ministers from Margaret 
Thatcher to David Cameron. The objective of this chapter is to show how a narrative of Britain as 
an outsider to the European Union has been constructed and maintained by the rhetoric of prime 
ministers’ speeches.  
 
 
2.1. The Outsider Tradition 
 
 
David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech draws a divide between Britain and the rest of the European 
Union, but the portrayal of Britain as an uncomfortable, distant member of the Union is not 
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Cameron’s own. What Cameron draws from is a decades-old narrative of “Britain as an outsider” to 
the EU.  
The idea of the UK as distinctly different from the countries on the European continent has 
been brought up time and again by various British public figures. Oliver Daddow recounts the 
history of the tradition in his essay “Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy 
Speeches from Thatcher to Cameron” (2015), providing examples from the speeches of British 
prime ministers. Daddow traces Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe from 1815 to 2015, 
diving the 200 years into five phases. 
 
Phase 1 (1815-1939): “Outsider as balancer: Stay out of European politics and 
conflicts unless compelled by force of events.” 
 
Phase 2 (1939–55): “Outsider as supporter: Encourage unity, associate with 
initiatives (for example, ECSC) and sometimes provide leadership (for example, WEU) 
Maintain UK commitment to the defence of Western Europe, via NATO and BAOR.” 
 
Phase 3a (1955-6): “Outsider as saboteur: Turn US against common market and 
tempt key nations such as Germany towards looser trading arrangements.” 
 
Phase 3b (1956-60): “Outsider as rival: Damage limitation via failed attempt to 
negotiate a European free trade area and successful creation of EFTA.”  
 
Phase 4 (1960-1973): “Outsider as supplicant: France vetoed first two applications, 
but negotiations hampered throughout by tactics, for example, on Commonwealth 
preferences.”  
 
Phase 5 (1974-2017): “Outsider as insider: Leadership on issues such as Single 
European market and deregulation, accompanied by disputes over budget and British rebate 
Increasing use of opt-outs and ‘red lines’ in politically sensitive matters Possibility of 
withdrawal from EU after referendum.” 
  
(Daddow “Interpreting” 74) 
 
Daddow notes that no British leader has advocated for outright isolationism, but that the question, 
throughout British history has been about the “depth and manner” of engagement in European 
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affairs (73). The dilemma about how much commitment should there be to European co-operation 
runs through all five phases.  
The first two phases see the UK exerting influence on European affairs from the outside: 
supporting the balance of power and ensuring security and financial stability, but never getting too 
involved in projects regarding European integration (73-76). The third phase, divided by Daddow 
into two stages: 3a and 3b, includes a change in British attitude and actions towards Europe from a 
benevolent outsider to a more hostile one. Between 1955 and 1960, the UK competed against the 
newly established European Economic Area (EEA) by attempting to launch “a rival British-led 
European project” (76). Daddow notes that Britain’s first response to European supranational 
integration was to try to “kill it off” by attempting to turn the United States against the common 
market and trying to limit desires for deeper involvement in nations like Germany (74, 76). This 
British sabotage of the European project, according to Daddow, has “tainted” the reception of 
Britain’s European policy to this day, causing British leaders to have to “head off potential charges 
of betrayal when setting out alternative visions for the future of European integration” (76).  
In Phase 4, Britain re-evaluated its European policy and pursued greater involvement in 
Europe. It was judged that EEC membership would benefit Britain economically by stimulating 
growth and attracting investment, and that it would also promote stability in Europe, thus increasing 
Britain’s security (77). Britain applied to become an EEC member in 1963 but its first application 
was vetoed by France, as was the second one in 1967 (Hadley). One can perhaps see the tone of 
Britain’s relationship with the EU being set during the years leading up to Britain’s entry. The 
humiliation of a former imperial power being forced to apply several times and being 
unceremoniously denied marked the beginning of the UK-EU-relationship. Former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair notes in his autobiography, that the reason the British have a more suspicious, 
even negative, attitude towards the EU, is because Britain did not invent it (Blair A Journey, 533). 
Britain was not part of the origin of the European project, largely due to its own desire to remain 
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outside, but also due to other European countries not wanting it to join. Phase 4 sets out the 
complex, almost schizophrenic relationship with Europe, where Britain does not necessarily want to 
take part in European integration but it needs to in order to advance its security and prosperity. 
Professor Nick Bloom argues that Britain’s entry into a common European market and the 
competition with other companies forced British industry to improve and innovate, resulting in 
growth (Bloom, qtd. in Giles). The common market brought in lower tariffs and harmonisation of 
regulations, which also boosted trade in Britain (Giles).  
Britain was finally admitted into the EEC in 1973 and took part in European integration 
until the referendum of June 2016 where the majority of the British electorate voted to leave the 
European Union. Phase 5 of Daddow’s theory is of particular interest to this thesis as it is the 
timeframe within which all of the speeches analyzed in this chapter take place. “Outsider as an 
insider” is an apt description of how Britain’s role in the EU is portrayed by the PMs. What marks 
all the speeches is a constant balancing between wanting to underline Britain’s exceptional nature, 
while at the same time reminding people that Britain is very much a part of the Union. Daddow also 
notes that during Phase 5 the issue of Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe transformed 
from a relatively technical area of government discussion into a “hotly contested political issue” 
(Daddow 78).  
Cary Fontana and Craig Parsons identify four traditions of British politics which were 
formed during the post-WWII period, and which have significantly contributed to Britain’s attitude 
towards the emerging European integration, before Britain’s entry into the EEC. These traditions 
run through Daddow’s phases and serve as an exploration of the issues that have shaped the UK’s 
relationship with the rest of Europe. The first tradition is the idea of Britain being global not 
European (Fontana & Parsons 90). The concern expressed by many politicians has been that deeper 
involvement in Europe would jeopardize Britain’s ties to Commonwealth countries or weaken its 
special relationship with the United States (90). The rhetoric of many on the Leave -side of the 2016 
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referendum drew heavily from this tradition, implying that being out of the EU would allow Britain 
to be a part of the larger world, and that EU-membership meant inward-looking isolation from 
global affairs.7 Current Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit -speech in January 2017 highlighted 
the future of Britain as an outward-looking nation. “[It] is important to recognise this fact. June the 
23rd was not the moment Britain chose to step back from the world. It was the moment we chose to 
build a truly Global Britain” (May). What is implied here is that Britain was not able to be truly 
global inside the EU. Similarly to the Conservatives, the desire to portray the UK as more global 
than European played a major role in the Labour Party’s rhetoric in the 1990s and 2000s. Pauline 
Schnapper notes that the importance of a special relationship with the United States was highlighted 
with Britain being presented as a bridge between Europe and the US, implying that “Europe” and 
“the world” were two different things. The idea of global vs. European influenced Labour’s 
approach to Europe throughout Britain’s membership of the EU. (Schnapper 160)  
The second tradition is the notion of parliamentary sovereignty that rejects federal or shared 
power (Fontana & Parsons 90). EU-institutions were not seen as having the same kind of 
democratic mandate and authority that a parliament and a single-party majoritarian government has 
(90). The perception that the EU is a centrally-governed organism which seeks to usurp the power 
of its members has been played up by many British politicians. Margaret Thatcher stated in her 
“Bruges” speech in 1988, that the “willing and active cooperation of sovereign states” was essential 
to the success of the European Community. She warned that:  
 
To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a  
European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the 
objectives we seek to achieve. 
 
(Thatcher) 
 
                                                 
7 Shortly after the referendum, the newly appointed foreign secretary Boris Johnson wrote an opinion piece where he 
argued that now that Britain was leaving the EU, it would be able to truly be global and open to the world (Johnson).  
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The third tradition concerns the desire of British politicians, particularly of the 
Conservatives, to see themselves as pragmatic rather than utopian. Fontana and Parsons note that 
“this mind-set made European negotiations where acceptance of abstract principles was a 
precondition, as in the early ‘community’ proposals, seem reckless” (91). The final tradition is that 
the British saw their society as distinctly liberal. The belief that Britain’s industrial revolution and 
latter economic prosperity was due to a decentralization and limited state intervention into 
economic affairs caused the British to see the perceived centralization of the EU as a threat to 
economic success (91).   
Fontana and Parsons note that these traditions, which heavily influence British public 
discourse about the EU to this day, are not natural or inevitable (89). The traditions are not based on 
an objective reality, and are often contradictory, both internally and in relation to each other. For 
example, the idea of Britain’s membership of the EU having hindered its global involvement seems 
absurd as Britain has benefitted greatly from its membership of the EU in terms of trade and 
industrial development (Giles). Yet, politicians have for decades used these traditions in their 
rhetoric to argue for Britain to have a certain type of relationship with the EU. Margaret Thatcher 
spent much of her “Bruges” speech arguing that EU-regulations were in danger of hurting the 
British economy.8  
Daddow argues that the OT appeared as a “technique for managing (but never resolving) 
intraparty cabinet and Whitehall battles between the proponents of limited liability, on the one hand, 
and those pushing for a continental commitment, on the other” (73). This applies to both 
Conservative and Labour prime ministers, as both parties have had their share of infighting over the 
issue of the European integration. What emerges from the speeches analysed in this thesis, is that 
Labour PMs speak much less about Britain’s exceptionality than the Conservatives. Both Tony 
Blair (1997-2005) and Gordon Brown (2005-2010) seem to wholeheartedly embrace the idea of the 
                                                 
8 In the “Bruges” speech, Thatcher offers examples of how Britain has rolled back regulation and opened its markets, 
resulting a stronger economy, and warns the EC that excessive regulation could jeopardise all this (Thatcher).  
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EU and express their desire for Britain to play an active role in it. Conservatives on the other hand 
appear much more cautious in their words about how far European integration should go. One could 
draw the conclusion that Labour is a pro-EU party and that the Conservatives are a Eurosceptic 
party. There is much truth in this. However, to fully understand why the OT became such a central 
theme in Britain’s attitude towards the EU, we must look at the history of Britain’s two main 
political parties. 
 
 
2.2. Pro-European Tories and anti-European Socialists? 
 
 
It was the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath who took the UK into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.9 This decision was met with opposition from the Labour 
Party who were concerned that the EEC would prevent the advance of socialist policies in Britain 
and infringe on British sovereignty (Sassoon 90). In the general election of 1974, the Labour Party 
campaigned with a promise to hold a referendum on whether Britain should remain a member of the 
EEC. When Labour came into office, Prime Minister Harold Wilson held the referendum in 1975. 
The newly elected Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher campaigned strongly in favour of 
remaining, stating that: “Everyone should turn out in this referendum and vote yes, so that the 
question is over once and for all, we are really in Europe, and ready to go ahead” (Walsh). Labour, 
on the other hand, were deeply divided on the issue. The result of the vote was a resounding “yes” 
from the electorate, and the issue of whether Britain should be a member of the EEC became 
sidelined from mainstream political discussions for several years. (Walsh).  
                                                 
9 The EEC consisted then of the six original members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, and the three new additions: the UK, Denmark and Ireland (“1973: Britain joins the EEC”) 
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While the Labour cabinet were fighting amongst themselves about their party’s policy 
towards Europe, the Conservatives presented a united front. The economic stagnation and high 
inflation were seen as a consequence of Labour’s mismanagement of the economy and the 
Conservative Party’s alternative economic model based on lower taxes and privatization of key 
industries proved a winner in the 1979 General Election (Greeson 4; 7-9). Conservative Leader 
Margaret Thatcher became prime minister, and her eleven-year term shaped the nation in numerous 
ways. In terms of Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe, she deepened the OT and ushered in 
a new era of Conservative Euroscepticism which also played a major role in the 2016 referendum. 
Thatcher began her tenure as the Tory leader singing a very pro-EEC tune as evidenced by her 
rhetoric during the 1975 referendum campaign (Walsh). She, however, began to adopt more 
Eurosceptic positions as a response to further European political integration. This culminated in her 
“Bruges” speech in 1988, where she, much like David Cameron decades later, put forth a narrative 
of Britain as a European nation with deep ties to the countries on the continent, while at the same 
time reminding everyone that Britain is exceptional and mainly interested in being part of an 
economic union, not a political one.  
In her speech to the College of Europe (commonly referred to as the “Bruges” speech), 
Thatcher mounts a criticism of what she sees as increasing European integration leading towards a 
federal Europe.  
 
The Community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly 
modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept. Nor must it be 
ossified by endless regulation. The European Community is a practical means by which 
Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there 
are many other powerful nations and groups of nations. 
 
(Thatcher) 
 
Thatcher portrays the objective of the EEC as strictly practical, without much philosophy or 
ideology. The last phrase of the quote is of particular interest as it sets the mode in which future 
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Conservative prime ministers approached the issue of Britain in Europe: practicality is key, 
exemplifying Fontana and Parson’s third tradition of valuing pragmatism above all. Like Thatcher, 
John Major and David Cameron emphasize that what Britain wants out of European integration is 
deeper co-operation on trade, but not on a political level. In his Leader’s Speech at the Conservative 
party conference in 1992, Major states that: “[E]motion must not govern policy. At the heart of our 
policy lies one objective and one only - a cold, clear-eyed calculation of the British national interest. 
What is right for Britain. What is right for our future” (Major). Similarly, Cameron argues that for 
the British “[The] European Union is a means to an end – prosperity, stability, the anchor of 
freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores – not an end in itself” (Cameron 
2). All three Conservative prime ministers portray Britain’s participation in European integration as 
strictly pragmatic. Britain is not interested in some lofty ideals about a brotherhood of Europe, but 
instead wants to use the union to further British prosperity and security. This sentiment echoes the 
ideas put forth in Phase 4 of the OT: economy and defense are the primary, it not the only, reasons 
for Britain’s membership of the European Project (Daddow “Interpreting” 77). 
Fontana and Parsons argue that Thatcher’s talk of practicality and pragmatism is actually a 
cloak to conceal her true message which is that of nationalism and anti-EU sentiment (Fontana & 
Parsons 97). Drawing from the tradition of seeing European integration as a threat to a liberal 
economic system, Thatcher often criticized the very existence of institutions which she saw as 
hindering prosperity. Thatcher’s “Bruges” speech has a high emphasis on economic efficiency in 
the Community and how any new regulation introduced should be in service to freer trade. Thatcher 
criticizes inefficient and restrictive legislation in Europe and links public discontent with the 
Community to its overpowering regulation. “If we cannot reform those Community policies which 
are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly causing public disquiet, then we shall not get 
the public support for the Community's future development” (Thatcher). Thatcher also adopts a 
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rather mocking tone, expressing disbelief that some European leaders would wish to impose 
regulatory measures on member states, an action she likens to dictatorship. 
 
Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried 
to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and 
decisions away from the centre, there are some in the Community who seem to want to 
move in the opposite direction. 
 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see 
them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new 
dominance from Brussels. 
 
(Thatcher) 
 
Daddow notes that the rhetoric of Thatcher follows the Conservative critique of centralization and 
strong emphasis on freedom and devolution of powers to smaller units (Daddow “Interpreting” 83). 
In the “Bruges” speech the EEC is portrayed as a tool for advancing socialism and greater 
centralization to move towards creating a European “super-state”. Fontana and Parsons argue that 
Thatcher presented the British public with what Thatcher’s cabinet minister and later rival Geoffrey 
Howe called “an over-simplified choice, a false antithesis, a bogus dilemma, between one 
alternative, starkly labeled ‘cooperation between independent sovereign states’ and a second, 
equally crudely-labeled alternative, ‘centralised, federal super-state’, as if there were no middle way 
in between” (Howe 1990, qtd. in Fontana & Parsons 99).  
Thatcher’s rhetoric reveals another commonly held myth about the EU espoused by many 
British politicians, the idea that the Union is governed from the centre and laws and regulations are 
imposed on Member States who have no say in the matter. In reality, the EU is highly de-
centralised, with the majority of decisions being made by the Council of Ministers, which consists 
of the leaders of each Member State (“Council of Ministers”), and the European Parliament.10 
                                                 
10 The legislative process of the EU begins with the Commission submitting a proposal to the Council and the 
Parliament. The two institutions adopt the proposal either at the first or second reading. If the Council and the 
Parliament are not unanimous, the proposal will not be adopted. The power to adopt legislation is therefore in the hands 
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Under Thatcher’s premiership the prevailing narrative of UK’s relationship with the 
European community shifted towards greater Euroscepticism, especially within the Conservative 
Party. Thatcher’s arguments about the EU being too centralized, riddled with bureaucracy, and 
hindering economic prosperity have been repeated time and again, and are echoed strongly by 
David Cameron is his “Bloomberg” speech. The Conservative tradition of Euroscepticism, from 
which Cameron draws quite heavily, was established under Thatcher. Thatcher’s successor John 
Major added further layers to this narrative by seeking to solve the conflict between what one wants 
and what one needs.  
 
 
2.3. Head and Heart 
 
 
The term “Eurosceptic” includes a range of definitions from being skeptical about the European 
project but largely in favour of it, to advocating for the dismantling of the Union (Daddow “New 
Labour” 138-141). The former is commonly referred to as “soft” Euroscepticism, and the latter as 
“hard” Euroscepticism (145). Euroscepticism crosses party-lines but since the premiership of 
Margaret Thatcher it has been more prominent in the Conservative party. Martin Holmes notes that 
Thatcher’s “Bruges” speech “transformed [Euroscepticism] from a sideshow to centre stage” and 
that it has since become a “permanent feature of the political landscape” in Britain (qtd. in Daddow 
138).  
When Thatcher was ousted in 1990 by her own party, the divisions among the Conservatives 
on the issue of Europe came out in full force. Thatcher’s successor John Major (1990-1997) had the 
momentous task of appeasing the hardline Eurosceptics in his party in the face of further European 
                                                 
of the Council and the Parliament, both of which consist of democratically elected representatives. (“The ordinary 
legislative procedure”) 
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integration. The hot-button issue of the day was the Maastricht Treaty which formally established 
the European Union (“Treaty of Maastricht”). The Tory cabinet were split on the issue with many 
ministers voting against the signing of the Treaty (Bevins). Britain did ratify Maastricht but 
obtained two major exemptions: it did not take part in the single currency and it did not sign the 
social chapter, which sought to unify legislation in EU countries. Britain also did not become part of 
the Schengen “no-borders”—scheme when it was put into effect in 1995 (Peers).  
During the tumultuous time of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, Major had to walk the 
line between securing the best possible deal for Britain in Europe, and not angering his cabinet 
members. In his Leader’s Speech at the 1992 Conservative Party conference, Major evokes the 
“Britain as an outsider”-narrative to assure his countrymen and –women that Britain’s membership 
of the newly established European Union did not mean loss of sovereignty.  
 
Of course, emotions run high. We saw that from both sides in that great Conference debate 
earlier this week. For many of you, I know, the heart pulls in one direction and the head in 
another. There is nothing that can stir the heart like the history of this country. It is part of 
us. Nothing can change that. 
  
But it’s a different world now. Our families are growing up in a different age. They 
know we can’t pull up the drawbridge and live in our own private yesterday. They know we 
live in a world of competition - and we can’t just wish it away. Change isn’t just coming, it’s 
here. I want Britain to mould that change, to lead that change in our own national interest.  
 
(Major) 
 
Again, like Thatcher, Major sees European integration as a purely practical matter, the “head” 
pulling in one direction. Integrating into the EU is a rational thing to do, even if the heart yearns to 
be free. This collusion of the European Union and loss of freedom is found in the speeches by all 
three Conservative prime ministers. What is paradoxical of course is that while Major states very 
strongly that his government opposes a centralised Europe, he has just signed a treaty that has 
significantly increased centralisation. The Maastricht Treaty established a political union (the EU), 
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expanded the role of the European Parliament, established the European Council, created an 
economic and monetary union (EMU), and introduced the ability for citizens of EU –countries to 
move freely inside member states (“Treaty of Maastricht”). These new measures were hot-button 
issues among those critical of the European project. 
Analysis of Major’s conference speech exposes the hypocrisy exhibited by many British 
prime ministers on the issue of European integration. Saying that Britain does not want further 
integration while at the same time signing new treaties that do exactly that sends a very mixed 
message to the British public. If centralisation and deeper integration are bad for Britain, why are 
successive governments agreeing to it? This division into “heart” and “head” does little to explain 
the need for Britain to be a member of the EU.  
Conservative prime ministers have in their speeches tried to diffuse this tension between 
“heart” and “head” by portraying Britain as a clog in the system: the one with its foot on the brake 
pedal with regard to the future of Europe and an opposition to those pushing Europe towards 
centralisation. The OT in Phase 5 has led Britain to constantly seek opt-outs and exemptions from 
integration. Major secured many exemptions from the Maastricht Treaty, as mentioned earlier. In 
1984, Thatcher negotiated a rebate for Britain’s financial contribution to the EEC. The idea was that 
Britain had been paying too much for its membership and should be recompensed. (“EU Budget”). 
During his negotiations with other EU-leaders in 2015 and 2016, David Cameron secured an 
exception for Britain from “ever closer union” which is seen by many as the EU’s founding 
ambition. He also negotiated limits on EU-migration, although those were deemed by many to be 
insignificant. (Landale).   
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty tore Major’s cabinet apart and weakened his position 
as Prime Minister. This lay the ground for the Labour Party to emerge from the political wilderness 
it been confined to under the Thacher years. The Labour Party’s approach to European integration 
differed from the Conservatives, and offered new nuances to the OT.  
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2.4. New Labour Europhiles  
 
 
While Thatcher moved the Conservatives towards Euroscepticism, the Labour Party battled with its 
own identity and was divided on whether to move politically closer to the centre or further to the 
left. A series of humiliating electoral losses had left Labour in the political wilderness.11 During the 
1980s, under the leadership of Neil Kinnock, Labour took steps towards more moderate policies and 
softened its anti-European integration stance. The two main parties, in a way, switched roles. When 
the Labour Party elected Tony Blair as its leader in 1994, a new brand of internationalism and 
centrist policies followed and Labour took on the moniker “New Labour” to signal a change within 
the party. (“History of the Labour Party”). Blair led Labour to a landslide victory in 1997,12 and the 
Labour government began moving towards becoming more of an insider in the EU. Blair expressed 
a desire for European political integration, not just for economic integration as the Tories had done. 
In his Leader’s Speech at the Labour Party Conference in 1999 Blair talks about the “forces of 
conservatism” that he sees holding Britain back as a country. With regard to the European Union, 
Blair addresses the issue of Euroscepticism, both in his own party and among the Conservatives. 
 
I pose this simple question: is our destiny with Europe or not? If the answer is no, then we 
should leave. But we would leave an economic union in which 50 per cent of our trade is 
done, on which millions of British jobs depend. Our economic future would be uncertain. 
 
But what is certain is that we would not be a power. Britain would no longer play a 
determining part in the future of the continent to which we belong. That would be the real 
end of one thousand years of history. We can choose this destiny. But we should do it with 
our eyes open and our senses alert, not blindfold and dulled by the incessant propaganda of 
Europhobes. 
 
(Blair “Leader’s Speech”) 
                                                 
11 In 1981 a group of Labour ministers left to form a new party, the SDP, which later joined forces with the liberals, 
creating the Liberal Democrats. There was much tension among the different factions of the party, mainly between the 
hard left and the centrists. (Beckett).  
12 Labour won 418 seats out of 659 with a majority of 179 seats, winning many areas that had traditionally voted 
Conservative (Maguire).  
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Blair argues that the Eurosceptics’ anti-EU “propaganda” is clouding the judgement of many British 
people when it comes the issue of European integration. Blair also emphasizes the importance of 
EU-membership to the British economy, but he takes a far more emotive approach to Europe than 
his Conservative predecessors.  
 
If we believe our destiny is with Europe, then let us leave behind the muddling through, the 
hesitation, the half-heartedness which has characterised British relations with Europe for 
forty years and play our part with confidence and pride giving us the chance to defeat the 
forces of conservatism, economic and political, that hold Europe back too. 
 
(Blair “Leader’s Speech”) 
 
Blair rejects the half-hearted commitment to the EU that he sees as having been the approach of 
Conservative prime ministers. The idea that Britain should constantly be pushing the brakes on 
further integration and asking for opt-outs and exemptions is criticized by Blair in another speech 
delivered in 2005 at the European Parliament in Brussels. “I am a passionate pro-European. I 
always have been”, Blair states. He takes on the Conservative idea of the Union as simply a means 
to an end.  
 
This is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common 
market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens. It 
always will be. I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong 
and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic 
market. 
 
(Blair “Speech to the European Parliament”) 
 
In his book New Labour and the European Union: Blair’s and Brown’s Logic of History, 
Oliver Daddow writes of the Labour prime ministers’ efforts to challenge the dominant narrative of 
Euroscepticism. By portraying themselves as “Europhiles” Blair and his successor Gordon Brown 
sought a more internationalist approach that would place Britain at the heart of the EU (Daddow 
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“New Labour” 109). Brown challenged the notion of Britain’s geography dictating its attitude 
towards Europe, stating that:  
 
We are an island that has always looked outwards, been engaged in worldwide trade and 
been open to new influences – our British qualities that made us see, in David Cannadine’s 
words, the Channel not as a moat but as a highway. An island position that has made us 
internationalist and outward looking. 
 
(Brown qtd. in Schnapper 160) 
 
Here Brown attempts to align a different set of values to Britishness. Brown also states in another 
speech that: 
 
Britain has a unique history – and what has emerged from the long tidal flows of British 
history – from the 2,000 years of successive waves of invasion, immigration, assimilation 
and trading partnerships, from the uniquely rich, open and outward looking culture – is I 
believe a distinctive set of British values which influence British institutions. 
 
(Brown qtd. in Schnapper 160) 
 
Brown acknowledges that Britain’s uniqueness is the result of immigration and openness, but 
similarly to Conservatives, points out Britain’s wholly unique character thereby underscoring the 
notion of Britain being distinctly different from other European nations. 
Daddow comes to the conclusion that while no British leader since 1973 has advocated that 
Britain should leave the European Union, they have “never attempted seriously to challenge the 
strong notion of outsiderliness underpinning Britain’s status as a reluctant partner in the 
organization” (Daddow “Interpreting” 85, italics mine). One of the key reasons why New Labour 
prime ministers who sought to challenge the OT failed to do so in any meaningful way, is to do with 
the idea of “outsiderliness” and ideas of British exceptionalism being intertwined with British 
identity.  
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What is apparent, however, is that both Blair and Brow sought to change the narrative of 
Britain in the EU by using rhetoric different from Conservative prime ministers. Their words build a 
bridge across the Channel: a bridge made, not of economic realities and necessities, but of shared 
values and goals. Yet while there were concrete efforts by New Labour to redefine Britain’s 
relationship with the EU, other issues, namely the Iraq War and Blair’s decision to align the UK 
with the US, put the country in opposition to many European countries, the Labour government 
never succeeded in rewriting the OT.  
It is important also to note that while New Labour was very much in favour of Britain being 
a more active member of the EU, the Labour Party in its current incarnation is not. Since the 
election of Jeremy Corbyn as Leader in September of 2015 the Blairites and Brownites have been 
purged from party leadership positions and a new tide of more leftwing MPs has moved to the front 
benches (Mason; “Corbyn's shadow cabinet reshuffle merely marks the beginning of rebuilding the 
Labour Party”). Corbyn himself has been characterized, sometimes quite cruelly, as a socialist relic 
from the 1980s. His lukewarm support for Remain in the EU-referendum drew criticism that he did 
not really want Britain to be a member of the EU.13 The Brexit-result led to a leadership challenge 
which Corbyn won due to support from party members (Adam). Corbyn’s reasons for being 
skeptical of the Union have been quite similar to those of Labour MPs in the 1980s; the fear that the 
EU is trampling workers’ rights, the perceived unfair treatment of Member States like Greece in 
midst of a financial crisis, and so forth. However, Corbyn’s approach to Brexit has been pragmatic. 
The Labour Party now advocates for Britain to remain in the single market and customs union, and 
opposes writing the date for UK’s exit from the EU into law. (Grice).  
Like the Conservatives, the Labour Party has been, and continues to be, divided on the issue 
of UK–EU relations. While Blair and Brown made attempts to shape the OT, or at least add more 
                                                 
13 During the referendum campaign Corbyn highlighted the strong need to reform the EU, but ultimately expressed 
support for Remain. Corbyn, however, sought to distance himself from David Cameron, despite both of them backing 
the same side in the referendum. (Moseley). 
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nuance to it, their attempts never truly succeeded. What the two New Labour prime ministers did, 
however, was bring the issue of how British identity is perceived and how this perception responds 
to deeper European integration, more to the centre stage. Blair and Brown did try to unravel the 
mythology of Britain’s so-called national identity, by attaching new values and ideas to it, such as a 
more pro-European attitude. The strong beliefs stemming largely from historical events and past 
narratives that have forged the identity, however, refused to give way. At least when confronted 
with the New Labour rhetoric. 
 
 
2.5. British Identity 
 
 
In his Leader’s Speech in 1992 John Major recounts a story of meeting a woman who expressed her 
concern over Britain signing the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
During the summer, when I was in Cornwall, a lady came up to speak to me. ‘Mr. Major,’ 
she said, ‘please, please don’t let Britain’s identity be lost in Europe.’  She didn’t tell me her 
name.  But she spoke for the anxieties of millions.  She spoke for this country.  She spoke 
for me.  So let me tell this Conference what I told that lady in Cornwall.  I will never - come 
hell or high water - let our distinctive British identity be lost in a federal Europe.  Let no one 
in this Conference be in any doubt: this Government will not accept a centralised Europe. 
 
And if there are those who have in mind to haul down the Union Jack and fly high the star-
spangled banner of a United States of Europe, I say to them: you misjudge the temper of the 
British people. And you do not begin to understand the determination of this Prime Minister 
to put the interests of this country first - now and always. 
 
(Major) 
 
This sentiment articulated by the woman in Cornwall illustrates perfectly why the task of 
challenging the OT proved so enormous for New Labour. The OT, on which Major leans very 
heavily in this passage, constructs British identity as incompatible with a European identity.  
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It is important to note here what we mean when we talk about “British” identity. After all, 
the UK consists of four separate countries: Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, and England, all of 
which have their own history, culture, and traditions. However, when discussing Britain’s 
relationship with Europe, the OT, and Euroscepticism, we must specify that we are talking about a 
particular form of English nationalism (Daddow “New Labour” 5). The mythology of history, 
religion, and politics regarding identity discussed below, has to do with Englishness. On the issue of 
the European Union it is apparent that anti-EU sentiment is far more widespread among the English 
than, for example, the Scottish. In the Brexit referendum, Scotland voted in favour of remaining in 
the EU14 and because of this, discussions about Scottish independence have once again become 
relevant, with First Minister Nicola Sturgeon threatening to stage another independence referendum 
if Brexit-negotiations force Scotland out of the single market (Carrell “Sturgeon reiterates”).   
Jeremy Paxman has remarked that “England remains the only European country in which 
apparently intellectual people can use expressions like ‘joining Europe was a mistake’ or ‘we 
should leave Europe’ as if the place can be hitched to the back of a car like a holiday caravan” (qtd 
in Daddow 125). Daddow comments on the conflation of England with Britain but also on the idea 
Paxman puts forth: that many British people see Britain as entirely separate and separable from 
Europe (125). This feeling of not really being a part of Europe stems largely from ideas of British 
exceptionalism: that Britain is simply just different from, and in many cases, better, than other 
European countries. Daddow identifies four components that make up the myth of British 
exceptionalism: geography, religion, war, and binary thinking (115). The first, geography, is 
illustrated well by this quote from David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech.  
 
I know that the United Kingdom is sometimes seen as an argumentative and rather strong-
minded member of the family of European nations. And it's true that our geography has 
shaped our psychology. We have the character of an island nation: independent, forthright, 
                                                 
14 Scotland voted 62%-38% in favour of remaining in the EU, while England went 53,4%-46,6% for leave (“EU 
Referendum Results” BBC). 
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passionate in defence of our sovereignty. We can no more change this British sensibility 
than we can drain the English Channel. 
 
(Cameron 2) 
 
Cameron identifies Britain’s geography as a driving factor behind its attitude towards the European 
Union. He is not alone in this thinking. Daddow traces a narrative that claims Britain has always 
had trouble with feeling a part of a European trans- or multinational union because of “the 
uniqueness of living on an island set apart from mainland Europe” (Daddow “New Labour” 115). 
As Cameron argues, Britain can never fully go along with European integration because its national 
character is profoundly opposed to it. The idea of geography making Britain wholly unique and 
different from rest of Europe has also, according to Daddow, caused the British to see Europe; not 
as a collection of different nations but as a monolith, a mass of “Europeans” who are the “them” to 
Britain’s “us” (116). Daddow notes that Europe has for decades been constructed as the Other in 
British public discourse (112-113).  
Another component of British exceptionalism, according to Daddow, is war. Phillip 
Coupland notes how continental Europe was seen as weak during WWII and Britain looked to the 
West to “a world order built around an Anglo-American axis” (qtd. in Daddow 117). This along 
with memories of the humiliation of being denied entry into the European Economic Area in the 
1960s15 caused Britain to view European integration with either disinterest or suspicion (117).  
Daddow also points out the importance of the “Dunkirk spirit” to British identity in relation to 
Europe. Jeremy Paxman identifies the evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk in 1940, shortly 
before France fell to the Nazis as a kind of “physical enactment of Britain’s suspicion about 
Europe” (qtd. in Daddow 118). The evacuation underlines the physical separateness of Britain from 
the continent, as British soldiers could cross the Channel to escape to safety. It demonstrates British 
                                                 
15 French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the first draft of Britain’s application already in 1963, and voted no on 
UK’s membership of the Common Market in 1967 (Connolly).  
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courage, and it re-inforces the centuries-old British belief that there is nothing but trouble on the 
continent (118-119). Particularly Conservative prime ministers have often referred to Britain’s 
accomplishments in the two World Wars, and used this as a reason why Britain’s requests for 
exemptions and opt-outs were justified. The wars were frequently invoked to remind other nations 
of Britain’s contribution to Europe’s freedom. 
 
Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a 
single power. We have fought and we have died for her freedom. Only miles from here, in 
Belgium, lie the bodies of 120,000 British soldiers who died in the First World War. Had it 
not been for that willingness to fight and to die, Europe would have been united long before 
now—but not in liberty, not in justice. And it was from our island fortress that the liberation 
of Europe itself was mounted. 
 
(Thatcher) 
 
Over the years, Britain has made her own, unique contribution to Europe. We have provided 
a haven to those fleeing tyranny and persecution. And in Europe's darkest hour, we helped 
keep the flame of liberty alight. Across the continent, in silent cemeteries, lie the hundreds 
of thousands of British servicemen who gave their lives for Europe's freedom. 
 
(Cameron 2) 
 
The New Labour prime ministers were not as willing to use history as a means of arguing 
against European integration. Gordon Brown tried to challenge the perceived incompatibility of 
British and European identities, stating that: “We should dismiss the notion that our history suggests 
being British is synonymous with being anti-European” (qtd. in Daddow “New Labour” 125). Here 
Brown questions the mythology of British heroism and patriotism being associated with opposition 
to other European nations. Brown represents a reimagining of the national identity with a pro-
European attitude as an essential component. As noted in the previous chapters, Brown attempts to 
shift the discourse on British identity away from Euroscepticism were not successful.  
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Differences in political systems between Britain and nations on the Continent have also 
contributed to ideas of British exceptionalism. Britain has a majoritarian political and electoral 
system: it has historically had only two political parties (Labour and Conservative) that have taken 
turns being in government or in opposition. Unlike many other European countries, Britain 
normally does not have multiparty coalition governments in Westminster, a notable exception being 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition from 2010 to 2015, led by Prime Minister Cameron. 
(Daddow 120). In the UK government, the opposition opposes and does little else. This, Daddow 
argues, has led to binary thinking, and lack of desire for co-operation across party lines (121). 
Again, this binary thinking mainly concerns England, as the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh 
Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly have electoral systems that resemble those of most 
European countries and the regional parliaments have had several coalition governments (121). 
The binary of Britain (or England) and Europe sees the UK as separate from other European 
countries. The conflation of “Europe” with “European Union” further attests to this (125). This “us 
vs. them”-mentality conjures up images of a hostile takeover. Making concessions to other EU 
member states can thus be seen as akin to surrendering part of British sovereignty to a foreign 
invader. John Major’s lady from Cornwall saw the EU as a threat to her Britishness: if the UK 
became more involved in the Union, her identity would be lost. As Major points out, this is a matter 
of the heart, not of the head. It is rational for Britain to be a member of the European Union as it 
benefits the country and its people greatly. The heart, however, feels a twinge of pain, because it 
senses it is losing something.  
The OT emerged not only as a political tactic to appease Eurosceptics in both parties, but 
also as a way of reconciling the need to be a part of a political and economic union to ensure 
prosperity and security with the desire to be a free and sovereign nation; an idea created by the 
mythology of British identity drawn largely from the country’s history. Daddow notes that the 
emphasis on British history as a source of identity and the strong perceived link between patriotism 
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and Eurosceptism meant that even the most openly pro-EU prime ministers Blair and Brown never 
truly suggested that Britain should become more European or that the British should adopt 
European characteristics, even if they challenged many myths about British identity (Daddow “New 
Labour” 161). The prevailing narrative of Britain’s EU membership has been that Britain is an 
exceptional country that it is different from the rest of Europe and can never fully be a part of the 
European Union unless its exceptionalism is respected. Britain is an outsider to Europe. There has 
been resistance to this narrative, namely from the two New Labour prime ministers, Blair and 
Brown. However, David Cameron being a Conservative, draws from a Conservative tradition of 
talking about the EU, in many passages echoing the words Thatcher’s “Bruges” speech. The OT, 
especially its Conservative iteration, provides the context for David Cameron’s 2013 “Bloomberg” 
speech. It also helps us understand why Cameron portrays the issue as he does, and it also offers 
some explanations as to why Britain voted to leave the European Union.  
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3. Rhetorical Situation 
 
 
This chapter utilizes theory on rhetorical situations to analyse David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” 
speech. The chapter is divided into subchapters dedicated to each component of a rhetorical 
situation (exigence, rhetor, audience, and constraints). This section of the thesis also utilizes 
Aristotelian theory on rhetoric, namely the four methods of persuasion/four proofs: influence of 
speaker/encoder proof (ethical); subject matter/reality proof (logical); appeals to emotion of 
audience/decoder proof (pathetic); and stylistic techniques of rhetor/signal proof (stylistic) 
(Kinneavy 237). The first three are particularly pertinent to the subject matter of this thesis as they 
correspond (although not perfectly) with three components of a rhetorical situation: rhetor, 
constraints, and audience. In the subchapters dealing with each component Aristotle’s proofs are 
used to further analyse how Cameron creates the rhetorical situation, what types of argumentation 
he uses, and how he addresses the audience. The proofs help us further categorize and understand 
Cameron’s argumentation.  
In each subchapter, how the OT and previous prime ministerial rhetoric manifest in 
Cameron’s speech is discussed to demonstrate that the rhetorical choices Cameron makes are not 
arbitrary but influenced by, especially Conservative, conventions and long-standing narratives about 
Britain’s relationship with the EU. This point of view also reveals more about the rhetorical 
situation and how a situation (which in this case is already rhetorical) guides and constrains the 
rhetor, but also how a rhetor is ultimately responsible for the choices they make. Cameron has no 
real obligation to continue in the same vein as the previous narratives, but he chooses to do so 
perhaps out of convenience and ease, or to avoid the overwhelming task of countering a decades-old 
narrative. It is necessary to note, however, that while this thesis recognises the overbearing nature of 
the OT and its effect on Cameron’s rhetoric, it does not absolve Cameron of responsibility when it 
comes to having helped sow the seeds for Brexit. The conclusion of this thesis is that Cameron’s 
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rhetoric may have done more to help the Leave-side than the Remain, and that Cameron misjudged 
the kind of response that would have been required to successfully argue his case. 
 
 
3.1. The Nature of Meaning 
 
 
Lloyd Bitzer coined the term rhetorical situation to analyse how all rhetorical discourse is 
dependent on the context in which it occurs (Bitzer 3). Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation as “a 
natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites 
utterance” (4). To Bitzer a situation invites a response and it is the duty of the rhetor to respond 
accordingly (5). However, in Bitzer’s definition the concept of a rhetorical situation does not appear 
to differ drastically from the idea of exigence which he defines as the problem, the question to 
which a rhetorical act is an answer (6). Bitzer’s understanding of exigence is discussed further in 
chapter 3.2., where a counterpoint by Richard Vatz is also introduced.  
It is worth reiterating here that Vatz does not share Bitzer’s theory of a situation/exigence inviting a 
response, but that the rhetor is the one who decides how to respond to a situation, and which 
elements of it to “give salience to” (Vatz 158).  
Vatz posits that the rhetor creates the situation and rhetoric creates reality, not vice versa 
(159). Scott Cosigny further points out that both Bitzer and Vatz are right and wrong; “a rhetorical 
situation is partly, but not wholly, created by the rhetor” (Cosigny qtd. in Grant-Davie 265). This 
point, in my view, is somewhat irrelevant, as Vatz recognises that there are certain conventions that 
guide the response, that in many ways dictate an appropriate response (Vatz 158). Bitzer talks about 
how the assassination of President Kennedy could only prompt certain types of responses, claiming 
that this was evidence of the situation controlling the rhetor (Bitzer 5). Vatz, however, notes that 
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while certain rhetorical discourses, such as one brought on by a death of a president, may be so 
ritualised that to analyse them would be tedious, this does not mean that the situation controls the 
rhetor. The rhetor being aware of the conventions is likely to opt to follow them (Vatz 160). 
However, a rhetor who breaks conventions is not automatically punished for not giving an 
“appropriate” response if his rhetoric is otherwise skilful or resonates with an audience. An example 
of this might be Donald Trump, whose colourful language and an almost complete disregard for 
what is appropriate and conventional in political rhetoric did not hinder his political prospects; quite 
the contrary.  
The crux of the disagreement between Bitzer and Vatz is a philosophical one concerning the 
nature of meaning. Vatz argues that Bitzer subscribes to a Platonist view where meaning resides in 
events; meaning is intrinsic to the thing that has it (Vatz 155). For Bitzer it is therefore logical that 
meaning flows from the events and that the events dictate and decide how rhetoric is used (qtd. in 
Vatz 155). An exigence is a thing that exists in reality, it has a certain meaning, and it is up to the 
rhetor to identify this meaning and convey it to an audience.  
Vatz takes a more sceptical approach to the philosophy of meaning, stating that meaning is 
created through language (156). Vatz argues that we learn about the world through someone else 
communicating events and facts to us. To Vatz there exist a myriad of different information, event, 
facts etc, out there and the translation of this information into reality is an interpretative act (156-
157). Vatz’s core argument is that “meaning is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors” 
(157). This argument is particularly poignant when we think about political rhetoric. There exists a 
certain reality of Britain’s relationship with the European Union: historical events, trade deals, 
multinational treaties etc. All of these things, however, are viewed through a layer of narrative that 
gives these situations and events their meaning. What the EU is in actuality (how its institutions 
operate for example) is oftentimes secondary to how it is portrayed to be, how it is talked about, 
what ideas are being associated with it. Vatz argues that a situation only has meaning when it is 
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interpreted by someone. Therefore, the person doing the interpreting has the power to present reality 
in a certain way. How the OT has been created and maintained through political rhetoric, and how 
narrative about British identity have guided Britain’s relationship with the EU, is further evidence 
of how language organizes reality and gives it meaning.  
As this thesis analyses David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech, it becomes apparent that 
Cameron gives salience to certain aspects of reality and ignores others. The rhetorical situation of 
Cameron’s speech reflects the Conservative tradition of Euroscepticism and long-standing myths of 
the OT about British identity, and is born into a context of a political challenge to Cameron’s party 
from the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP). These aspects of reality guide and constrain 
Cameron, but he is very much in charge of how he addresses them and how he uses his speech to 
create a new rhetorical situation.  
 
 
3.2. Exigence 
 
 
The first component of Bitzer’s theory on rhetorical situations is exigence. Bitzer defines exigence 
as “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a 
thing which is other than it should be” (Bitzer, 6). To Bitzer, exigence is what prompts the 
rhetorical act: “an exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when 
positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse” (6). While the exigence is 
to Bitzer an existing phenomenon, it has to be one that is capable of being altered. An exigence has 
to be a question that can be answered, a problem that can be solved. Bitzer argues that all rhetorical 
situations have at least one “controlling exigence” that functions as an “organizing principle” of the 
rhetoric (7). It “specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to be effected” (7). It is the 
exigence that dictates how the rhetorical discourse is created. The rhetor works under its organizing 
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principle, and the other components of a rhetorical situation (audience and constraints) are 
controlled by the exigence.  
According to Bitzer, the exigence is an objective fact, and its existence is independent of the 
actions of the rhetor (7). The real exigence may not always be recognized by the rhetor or the 
audience (7). Bitzer further complicates the concept of exigence by stating that exigence “may be 
strong or weak depending upon the clarity of [the rhetor’s] perception and the degree of their 
interest in it; it may be real or unreal depending on the facts of the case; it may be important or 
trivial” (7). What is peculiar here is the idea of an exigence being falsely perceived by the rhetor 
while being “unreal”. False perception or false interpretation, which Bitzer cites as a prime reason 
for the rhetor failing to produce discourse, hinges on the concept of the exigence as an objective 
fact. Bitzer asserts that: “the exigence and the complex of persons, objects, events and relations 
which generate rhetorical discourse are located in reality, are objective and publicly observable 
historic facts in the world we experience, are therefore available for scrutiny by an observer or critic 
who attends to them” (10-12, italics mine).  
Bitzer’s idea of the exigence as a fact reflects a philosophical view where there exists an 
objective reality irrespective of human perception and interpretation. Vatz counters Bitzer’s 
argument, stating that: “no situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its 
interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it” (154). Vatz 
argues that our understanding of the world and everything in it is therefore almost entirely 
dependent on perception and representation (156).  
Vatz describes a two-part process through which perception occurs. First, there are “events 
to communicate” (156). While to Bitzer, history seems like a stream of distinct events that follow 
one another inviting rhetorical responses, Vatz argues that the choice of events which are given 
relevance, is entirely arbitrary (157). In Bitzer’s theory the event rises to prominence independently 
and invites a certain response from the rhetor. Bitzer’s examples are of noted historical events such 
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as wars and assassinations so it does seem natural that they would have to be addressed. Vatz, 
however, takes the view that there exists a myriad of issues to choose from, and it is up to the rhetor 
to decide to which he will respond (158). 
The second part of Vatz’s process of perception is “translation of the chosen information 
into meaning” (157). Vatz describes this part as “an act of creativity”, where the rhetor creates and 
constructs meaning, in other words “translates” the meaning of the situation to the audience (157). 
In Bitzer’s theory on exigence the rhetor has a strangely passive role. All he has to do is portray the 
existing objective reality accurately, and he will have succeeded in his rhetorical act. Vatz, 
however, assigns much more responsibility to the rhetor and criticizes Bitzer for not truly holding 
the rhetor accountable for his words (158). According to Vatz, the rhetor chooses which aspects of 
reality he makes “salient” and is therefore responsible for the discourse he creates (158). 
However, Vatz focuses solely on the philosophy on the nature of meaning to criticize 
Bitzer’s theory on the exigence of a rhetorical situation. He does not address the other components 
of a rhetorical situation as defined by Bitzer (audience and constraints). In analysing a speech for 
example, it becomes apparent that it is not the rhetor alone who creates the discourse. After all, no 
utterance is born in a vacuum and released into a void. A rhetorical situation of a political speech 
has numerous factors that weigh on it. The way Bitzer portrays the exigence of a rhetorical situation 
and the examples he uses, however, does give the impression that the rhetor merely identifies the 
exigence which resides in the realm of objective reality that and then responds to it. This is what 
Vatz criticizes. The responsibility and power of the rhetor to choose to highlight or ignore aspects 
of the discourse are what Bitzer does not mention in his theory. 
David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech is a prime example of how a rhetor creates a certain 
rhetorical situation, but how that situation is also subject to ideas that exist in the wider discourse on 
the topic of the speech (UK–EU relationship). The exigence of Cameron’s speech is a complex of 
his explicitly expressed desire to address the issues, and the political realities surrounding the 
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speech. This chapter analyses Cameron’s own contribution to the exigence of the rhetorical 
situation, and also looks at how the wider discourse, particularly the OT, affects how the exigence is 
formed. 
 
 
3.2.1. “This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe” 
 
 
Cameron opens his speech with the above statement, indicating that the reason for this speech is his 
own desire to speak. While Cameron uses his speech to highlight issues that one could say are in 
accordance with Bitzer’s definition of exigence, meaning they are problems and questions looking 
for solutions and answers, it is good to keep in mind that Cameron, even by his own admission, is 
not bound by any specific reality that he feels compelled to address. However, one can see that 
Cameron uses the idea that his speech is prompted by a problem that needs to be addressed.  
After waxing poetic about the history of Europe and the ideological origins of the EU (to be 
discussed further in chapter 3.4.), he states his desire “to speak to you today with urgency and 
frankness about the European Union and how it must change – both to deliver prosperity and to 
retain the support of its peoples” (Cameron 1). Cameron argues that his speech has to be delivered 
now, since an urgent evaluation of the problems facing Europe is needed. This statement appeals to 
an understanding similar to Bitzer’s, where there are real–life events that rhetorical acts are 
addressing and trying to influence.  
Cameron’s identification of the exigence of his rhetorical act follows the speeches of his 
predecessors in the sense that it is marked by an idea that there is something wrong in the EU and 
that it needs to change to better serve British interests. Like Margaret Thatcher before him, 
Cameron argues that the main reason behind his need to make this speech are the restrictions of the 
market that hinder trade and prevent prosperity. Cameron states that: “These problems have been 
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around too long. And the progress in dealing with them, far too slow” (4). Cameron also argues that 
there is a growing frustration among the people of EU member states and this is the result of the EU 
seen as acting against the people’s will on issues like austerity and taxation (4). Cameron states that 
EU-leaders have “a duty to hear these concerns. Indeed, we have a duty to act on them” (4).  
Cameron’s core argument is that the EU needs “fundamental, far-reaching change” (5). He 
goes on to list his five-point plan for improving the union (competitiveness, flexibility, de-
centralization, democratic accountability, and fairness) (5). According to Cameron, the reason for 
the speech, the exigence of the rhetorical act, is found solely in the inadequacies of the EU. The aim 
of the speech is to persuade other EU-leaders to support his reformation efforts. The “Bloomberg” 
speech thus exemplifies Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical act attempting to solve the exigence, 
thereby ending the discourse (Bitzer 7).  
However, when we look at the political atmosphere at the time of Cameron’s speech, we see 
that there are aspects of reality Cameron chooses not to “give salience to”, to quote Vatz. Many 
analysts of British politics have noted that Cameron’s desire to seek to reform the EU was largely 
brought on by a threat to his own position in the form of a strong Eurosceptic element in the 
Conservative party16 and the fear of the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) challenging 
Conservative seats in the coming elections.17 The promise of a referendum was used as a campaign 
tactic to win votes back from UKIP. The fact that Cameron does not even mention these events save 
for a few vague references to the British distrust and dislike of the EU being rather high, attests to 
the exigence for this speech being primarily Cameron’s own creation.  
Cameron states that the idea to hold this speech, to seek reform in the EU, to hold a 
referendum is his own proactive solution to the many issues with the UK-EU relationship. The 
                                                 
16 Over 100 Eurosceptic Conservatives signed a letter in June 2012 calling for legislation that would guarantee the EU –
referendum, pushing Cameron to address the issue in the “Bloomberg” speech (“EU referendum: 100 Tory MPs back 
call for vote”).  
17 UKIP become the largest UK-party in the European Parliament following its major victory in the 2014 European 
Parliamentary elections (“Results of the 2014 European Elections”).  
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evidence of the political pressure on Cameron’s leadership and electoral prospects attests, however, 
that the driving force behind the “Bloomberg” speech is a reaction to a certain political reality. By 
promising to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU if his party were to win the 
general election of 2015, Cameron is courting support from the Eurosceptics. Cameron also echoes 
many of the Eurosceptic talking points when pointing out the areas in need of reform: the Union is 
inefficient, undemocratic, and unwilling to change. He positions himself as a defender of Britain, 
hoping to boost his own credentials as a prime minister who is tough on Europe.  
Cameron’s self-expressed exigence for his speech follows a pattern found also in the 
speeches of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, where the audience addressed is the European 
Community. Thatcher opens her speech by stating her desire to correct some misconceptions about 
Britain’s attitude towards the EU. Thatcher evokes history as a justification of her right to criticize 
the EC and seek to reform it.  
 
I want to start by disposing of some myths about my country, Britain, and its relationship 
with Europe and to do that, I must say something about the identity of Europe itself. Europe 
is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the European idea the property of any 
group or institution. We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any 
other nation. Our links to the rest of Europe, the continent of Europe, have been the 
dominant factor in our history … The European Community belongs to all its members. It 
must reflect the traditions and aspirations of all its members. 
(Thatcher) 
 
While Tony Blair’s approach to UK-EU relations was far more positive, as noted in previous 
chapters, he too sets the urgent need for reform as the exigence of his speech to the European 
Parliament.  
 
This is a timely address. Whatever else people disagree upon in Europe today, they at least 
agree on one point: Europe is in the midst of a profound debate about its future. 
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I want to talk to you plainly today about this debate, the reasons for it and how to resolve it. 
In every crisis there is an opportunity. There is one here for Europe now, if we have the 
courage to take it. 
 
(Blair “Speech to the European Parliament”) 
 
All three prime ministers repeat the longstanding feature of British political rhetoric that the EU is 
in urgent need of reform. This they all state as the reason for their speech, the exigence of the 
rhetorical act. With Thatcher and Cameron, the desire to seek reform is strongly related to Fontana 
and Parson’s tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, which rejects federal power. As illustrated by 
quotes from the Conservative prime ministers, the main complaint about the EU among many 
Conservatives is that it is too centralized. The things that Cameron singles out for reform have to do 
with devolving power back to member states and thus increasing their sovereignty.  
The exigence of Blair’s speech is also the need to reform the EU, but his approach is 
completely different and diverts from the OT significantly. He is not seeking exemptions from 
integration but argues that the EU needs to renew itself in order to survive in a changing world. 
Blair recounts the historical achievements of the Union and states that:  
 
 
Now, almost 50 years on, we have to renew. There is no shame in that. All institutions must 
do it. And we can. But only if we remarry the European ideals we believe in with the 
modern world we live in. 
 
(Blair “Speech to the European Parliament”) 
 
Where Blair’s speech offers assurances of commitment to the ideals of the EU and seeks to 
dispel myths about Britain’s desire to remain an outsider, Cameron chooses to follow the 
Conservative traditions and iterations with fortify the OT and create further distance between the 
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UK and the rest of the EU. The exigence of Cameron’s speech, as expressed by him, is the need for 
the EU to change so that Britain can be more comfortable in it.  
 
 
3.3. Rhetor 
 
 
Keith Grant-Davie expands on Bitzer’s components of a rhetorical situation, adding a fourth 
category: the rhetor. To Bitzer, the rhetor does not exist as a component before the discourse is 
created except when the rhetor’s personal character etc. can act as a constraint on his rhetorical act 
(Bitzer 8). Grant-Davie, however, does see the rhetor as an active component of the situation, 
stating that while the role of the rhetor is partly determined, it is often open to redefinition (Grant-
Davie 269). The rhetor must consider who they are in a given situation and be aware of how their 
identity may vary (269).  
The rhetor, even if addressing the audience alone, is never defined as a simple unity of 
persona. David Cameron has multiple identities in the “Bloomberg” speech: an EU-leader, a British 
prime minister, a leader of the Conservative Party, a British citizen. All these roles overlap and 
form his persona as the rhetor in his speech. Roger Cherry notes that there is a “contrast between 
the ethos of the historical author and any persona created by that author” (qtd. in Grant-Davie 269-
270). Cameron’s speech is constrained by the preconceived role he has, but he is also using the 
rhetorical act to create and shape his persona to fit his message.   
Aristotle’s ethical proofs concern the rhetor’s character and his attractiveness to the 
audience (Killingsworth, 250). According to Aristotle, a successful rhetor should exhibit good 
sense, good will, and good moral character (Kinneavy 239). Cameron attempts to convince the 
audience of his good intentions towards them, and sets out to create a specific kind of persona as a 
rhetor to better his chances of persuading his listeners.  
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3.3.1. “I will not rest until this debate is won” 
 
 
Cameron begins his speech by stating that he wants to speak with “urgency and frankness” about 
how the European Union is in need of change (Cameron 1). He follows this with a caveat: “But 
first, I want to set out the spirit in which I approach these issues” (2). Right off the bat, Cameron 
expresses his good will towards the audience. His aim is to make sure that what he means is not 
misunderstood or taken to as forceful or mean-spirited. This is his personal appeal to the audience. 
However, it can be seen as a slightly confusing statement as he says that this is to clarify how he 
wants to approach the issue of Britain’s membership of the EU, and then goes on to list the various 
constraints that he says dictate Britain’s approach: from Britain having the character of an island 
nation and being therefore reluctant to integrate further into Europe (2). Cameron uses this 
mythology about Britain to argue that his hands are tied; that he has to approach the issue from this 
perspective because his country’s history dictates it.18  
What should be noted here is how Cameron constructs his own persona as the rhetor in his 
speech. Despite having identified Britain as being somewhat reluctant to deepen its ties with the 
EU, he assures his audience that he is not like that.  
 
I never want us to pull up the drawbridge and retreat from the world. I am not a British 
isolationist. I don't just want a better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too. 
 
(Cameron 3) 
 
Cameron is demonstrating his good will towards the EU-audience. His aim is not to tear the Union 
apart, he very much wants it to succeed, but he is seeking reform in order to make it easier for those 
with a certain “island-mentality” to be more comfortable with Britain’s membership of the EU. 
                                                 
18 Cameron’s use of this type of argumentation is discussed in chapter 3.5. 
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Cameron is also using very similar rhetoric to that of Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges” speech, where 
she assures her European audience that her desire is for the European Community to transform to be 
more in line with what Britain wants, not for Britain to withdraw from the Community. 
 
Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the  
European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community. 
 
(Thatcher) 
The difference between the two Conservative prime ministers is that Thatcher argues that Britain is 
committed to being a member of the EC, while Cameron only speaks of his own personal 
commitment. He recognizes the existence of “British isolationists”, but affirms that he is not one. 
This has a rather interesting effect, considering the key argument Cameron presents to the EU in his 
speech. Cameron is banking on his pro-EU persona to convince the EU to grant him reforms, the 
argument being that if reforms are not made, Cameron might not be able to subdue the isolationist 
elements in his government or in Britain as a whole.19   
Cameron further attempts to strengthen the persuasiveness of his argument by explicitly and 
implicitly identifying the roles in which he speaks. “So I speak as British prime minister with a 
positive vision for the future of the European Union. A future in which Britain wants, and should 
want, to play a committed and active part” (Cameron, 3). As theorists on the concept of rhetorical 
situation have noted, rhetors have roles that guide and even restrict their rhetoric (Grant-Davie 269). 
David Cameron obviously has a set of pre-ordained roles that set certain expectations. He is the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Leader of the Conservative Party, a member of EU’s 
Council of Ministers and so forth. The audience views Cameron through the prisms of these roles, 
and the audience’s willingness to receive his message hinge upon their preconceived notions of 
Cameron. These notions are largely beyond the rhetor’s control, and they might be seen as what 
                                                 
19 Cameron’s way of addressing his EU–audience to implicitly put forth this very point is further discussed in chapter 
3.4.1. 
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Lloyd Bitzer identifies as the “reality” that guides a rhetorical act (Bitzer 9). However, as Richard 
Vatz notes, the rhetor has agency; not only to shape and create an exigence but also to shape and 
create his own persona through rhetoric (Vatz 158). In the “Bloomberg” speech Cameron quite 
clearly seeks to present himself in a certain way. This may be at odds with how the audience 
perceives him, but he nevertheless makes distinct attempts to create a specific type of persona: that 
of a maverick.  
When addressing the criticism some have expressed about the danger of openly questioning 
Britain’s relationship with the EU at a time when the Union is going through a financial crisis and 
Euroscepticism is on the rise in Britain, Cameron responds by saying: “There are always voices 
saying ‘don’t ask the difficult questions’” (Cameron 3).  
 
The biggest danger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate change, but 
from those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has experience 
of heretics who turned out to have a point.  
 
(4, italics mine) 
 
Cameron is going against the grain to fight for a better Union and better deal for Britain. Saying that 
“heretics” have often been proven right implies that, in the long run, his what might now seem 
unnecessary and uncomfortable reforms, will turn out to be needed and beneficial.  
Cameron talks about how some in the EU argue that the Union’s philosophical origins20 
mandate a union that is always moving towards greater and deeper integration, culminating in a 
federal state (7). It does seem that Cameron is implying that there is an almost religious fervour 
among those who wish to establish a centralised, federal EU, and thus his de-centralising reforms 
that seek diversity and flexibility are regarded as heretical by many in the Union. This underlines 
                                                 
20 Altiero Spinelli, who is considered to be one the founders of the European Union, and after whom the main building 
of the European Parliament is named, was a strong proponent of federalism. While being imprisoned by the Italian 
fascists from 1927 to 1943, Spinelli wrote a manifesto titled “Towards a Free and United Europe” where he proposed 
the formation of a supranational federation of states in order to prevent war in Europe. (“Altiero Spinelli: an unrelenting 
federalist” 
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Cameron’s portrayal of himself as the only one having the courage to question the core tenets of the 
EU. 
When Cameron talks about some people arguing it is irresponsible to have a referendum 
while support for the EU in Britain is “wafer thin”, he states that “the question mark is already there 
and ignoring it won't make it go away. In fact, quite the reverse. Those who refuse to contemplate 
consulting the British people, would in my view make more likely our eventual exit” (9). Cameron 
again presents himself as the only one brave enough to confront the issue head-on. He does not shy 
away from a challenge because he knows it is ultimately for the good of Britain and the EU. “That 
is why I am in favour of a referendum. I believe in confronting this issue – shaping it, leading the 
debate. Not simply hoping a difficult situation will go away” (9). The implication here is that of 
Cameron’s reforms are not enacted and if a referendum is not had, the question of Britain’s 
membership of the EU will continue to go unanswered and it will plague domestic and international 
politics for years to come.  
But Cameron also warns of having the referendum before he has had a chance to negotiate a 
better deal for Britain:  
 
I understand the impatience of wanting to make that choice immediately. But I don't believe 
that to make a decision at this moment is the right way forward, either for Britain or for 
Europe as a whole.  
 
(9) 
 
I understand the appeal of going it alone, of charting our own course. But it will be a 
decision we will have to take with cool heads. Proponents of both sides of the argument will 
need to avoid exaggerating their claims.  
 
(11) 
 
Cameron has sympathy for the emotional argument for sovereignty, but, evoking John Major’s 
“heart and head”-analogy, he urges everyone to assess this issue rationally and pragmatically. Here 
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Cameron casts himself as the arbiter of reason and level-headedness, guiding other politicians and 
public figures to keep their cool so as to not muddle the issue.  
Cameron ends his speech assuring the audience of his personal commitment to enacting 
meaningful change:  
 
Let me finish today by saying this. I have no illusions about the scale of the task ahead. I 
know there will be those who say the vision I have outlined will be impossible to achieve. 
That there is no way our partners will co-operate. That the British people have set 
themselves on a path to inevitable exit. And that if we aren’t comfortable being in the EU 
after 40 years, we never will be. 
 
But I refuse to take such a defeatist attitude – either for Britain or for Europe. Because with 
courage and conviction I believe we can deliver a more flexible, adaptable and open 
European Union in which the interests and ambitions of all its members can be met. With 
courage and conviction I believe we can achieve a new settlement in which Britain can be 
comfortable and all our countries can thrive. 
 
And when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an 
arrangement, I will campaign for it with all my heart and soul. Because I believe something 
very deeply. That Britain's national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open 
European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it. Over the coming 
weeks, months and years, I will not rest until this debate is won. For the future of my 
country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for 
generations to come. 
 
(13-14) 
 
Cameron’s passionate assurances of his deep devotion to this issue is offered as a testament of his 
good will towards his audience, both in the EU and in Britain. He presents himself as a tireless 
warrior, willing to do anything it takes to succeed. “I will not rest until this debate is won”. He will 
not give up because this is something that he truly believes in. Cameron’s role as a rhetor, as he 
himself constructs it in this speech, is that of a maverick unafraid of a challenge, willing to face his 
opponents, fearlessly taking on the institutions and establishment of the EU: “For the future of my 
country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for 
generations to come” (14).  
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Much of the UK’s history in the EU has been about pushing against the tide on further and 
deeper integration. In this aspect Cameron follows the OT to a T. His maverick persona is about 
challenging the core tenets of the EU and seeking new exemptions for Britain, just as his 
Conservative predecessors have done. Cameron is echoing many of the lines in Margaret Thatcher’s 
“Bruges” speech, from her assurances that the UK is committed to the Union despite asking for a 
different deal than the rest of the Union, to her criticisms of the Union limiting British economic 
growth and prosperity. Cameron also makes a point of wanting to safeguard the sovereignty of EU 
Member States, evoking Fontana and Parson’s second political tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty being paramount. “My third principle is that power must be able to flow back to 
member states, not just away from them” (Cameron 7).21  
Cameron’s rhetor-persona is a no-nonsense politician seeking pragmatic and reasonable 
reform. Cameron is willing to take on the EU-institutions and traditions to seek a better deal for 
Britain in the form of exemptions, as his predecessors have done. This attitude plays well with the 
British audience as they have been primed for this kind of rhetoric by previous prime ministers. Its 
effectiveness with the EU-leaders is harder to assess, after all Cameron does criticise the other EU 
leaders of being small-minded and short-sighted, albeit indirectly. Cameron also devotes a lot of 
time assuring the EU that he is not looking to distance Britain from the Union, but at the same time 
gently blames the EU and its blind commitment to their misguided doctrine for most things wrong 
in Britain.  
The OT manifests itself in Cameron’s, albeit rather mildly expressed “No, No, No”-
attitude22 towards Britain’s involvement in European integration. His position as a “heretic” places 
him in the category with other Conservative prime ministers seeking to keep Britain as an outsider 
to the EU. 
                                                 
21 This quote also echoes Thatcher’s warnings against the centralisation of the European Community and how this 
would threaten the very foundations of democracy (discussed in chapters 2.1. and 2.2.) 
22 Margaret Thatcher famously said “No, No, No” when discussing calls by some in Europe for further central control in 
the European Community (“Euro Moments”) 
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3.4. Audience 
 
 
Bitzer defines the second component of a rhetorical situation, the audience as follows: “a rhetorical 
audience consists only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of 
being mediators of change” (Bitzer 7). Thus, an audience in a rhetorical sense consists of those who 
can hear the rhetoric and have the power to act on it. In the case of Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech, 
both explicitly identified audiences, the EU-leaders and the British public, have the ability to 
change things. Cameron’s audience thus constitutes a rhetorical audience.  
Bitzer does not devote much time to discussing the implications an audience has for a 
rhetorical situation, nor does Vatz, who is primarily focused on challenging Bitzer’s core argument 
about the nature of exigence. Keith Grant-Davie writes about how an audience is not “a 
homogenous body of people who have stable characteristics and are assembled in the rhetor’s 
presence” (Grant-Davie 270). The rhetor does not dictate who the audience is, even if he or she may 
attempt to do so during the rhetorical act, as Cameron does. Grant-Davie notes that a rhetor most 
often faces “composite” audiences that contain several factions or individuals that can differ quite 
drastically from one another (270). One of the failings of Cameron is his inability to recognize and 
properly address the complexity of his audience. He does explicitly speak to two different 
audiences: EU-leaders and the British public, but both these groups are treated as monoliths. 
Especially when it comes to the British public, Cameron highlights a specific faction of British 
discourse regarding the EU; the OT and its more Eurosceptic interpretation, and presents this a 
belief shared by all British people. As discussed in chapter 2.4., New Labour prime ministers have 
challenged aspects of the OT and presented a more pro-EU narrative. Cameron, however, draws 
heavily from a Thatcherite brand of Eurosceptism which has been at the forefront of Conservative 
politics since the 1980s.  
52 
 
Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford divide a rhetorical audience into “audience addressed”, the 
actual people, and “audience invoked”, the audience the rhetor has in mind (qtd. in Grant-Davie 
271). The rhetor can control the latter but not the former. This becomes apparent in Cameron’s 
speech as he assigns certain ideas to his invoked audience but cannot be entirely sure whether these 
roles are accepted by the audience addressed. Many British people might not recognize themselves 
as naturally having a more skeptical attitude towards the EU as Cameron puts it (Cameron 2). In 
fact, the reaction to the referendum result by those who voted for Remain23 attests to EU-
membership being an important, even emotional issue for many.  
 
 
3.4.1. “I say to the British people: this will be your decision” 
 
 
In Aristotelian theory on rhetoric, pathetic proofs refer to the rhetors appeals to emotion of audience 
(Kinneavy 237). Cameron’s speech is relatively free of pathos: attempts to appeal to the emotions of 
the audience through, for example, evocative imagery. Cameron mainly utilizes this technique at the 
beginning of his speech when talking about the origins of the European Union. Cameron advises his 
listeners to “remember the past” before talking about Europe’s future (Cameron 1). When 
describing the carnage of the Second World War, Cameron uses highly evocative language: “streets 
of European cities strewn with rubble” (1); “the skies of London lit by flames night after night. And 
millions dead across the world in the battle for peace and liberty” (1). He remarks that: “Healing 
those wounds of our history is the central story of the European Union” (1). Cameron spends 
several paragraphs recognizing and articulating the impact of the Second World War on the 
                                                 
23 After the referendum there have been numerous protest where Remain –voters have expressed their anger and 
concern over Britain leaving the EU. Around 50,000 people marched through London in protest in September 2017 
(Quinn), and there were also major protests outside the Conservative Party Conference in August 2017 (Stone).  
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philosophical origins of the Union, but then immediately underplays its relevance today. He asserts, 
similarly to Thatcher24, that the EU should not let its past cloud its judgement in the present, but that 
all future decisions ought to be made without too much consideration for emotional ties. 
 
And while we must never take this for granted, the first purpose of the European Union – to 
secure peace – has been achieved and we should pay tribute to those in the EU, alongside 
NATO, who made that happen. But today the main, over-riding purpose of the European 
Union is different: not to win peace, but to secure prosperity. 
 
(1)  
 
After this, the rest of the speech is largely void of any sentimental appeals, rather Cameron opts for 
argumentation based on practicality, reason, and logic. The only other time Cameron goes on to use 
pathetic proofs is when he is making the case for why Britain, despite being a “reluctant” member 
of the EU, still has deep ties to the Continent. Again, the discussion of wars and conquests are filled 
with the most emotive language and visual imagery of the speech:  
 
Over the years, Britain has made her own, unique contribution to Europe. We have provided 
a haven to those fleeing tyranny and persecution. And in Europe's darkest hour, we helped 
keep the flame of liberty alight. Across the continent, in silent cemeteries, lie the hundreds 
of thousands of British servicemen who gave their lives for Europe's freedom. 
 
 (2) 
 
The pathos of these passages quickly gives way to a more pragmatic and analytical argumentation 
based on logic and presented facts. The invoked audience is further divided into subsections and 
Cameron demonstrates his good will towards both the EU and the British public through identifying 
himself as part of those groups he wishes to persuade. 
                                                 
24 Thatcher, who also begins her “Bruges” speech by evoking the war-torn past of Europe, states that “The European 
Community is a practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world 
in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations” (Thatcher).  
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In the section titled: “Deliver prosperity, retain support” Cameron begins to directly address 
EU leaders: “So I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about the European Union 
and hot it must change – both to deliver prosperity and to retain the support of its people” (2). 
Cameron makes a distinction between “we” (the UK) and “you” (the EU). In this section Cameron 
identifies himself as a part of Britain, not the EU. 
 
We have the character of an island nation […] [We] come to the European Union with a 
frame of mind that is more practical than emotional […] For us, the European Union is a 
means to an end […] We insistently ask: how, why, to what end? 
 
(2, italics mine) 
 
However, after laying out the main problems presently plaguing the EU, namely lack of 
competitiveness and flexibility, Cameron asks the EU a series of rhetorical questions, except this 
time the “we” refers to EU-leaders, a group of which Cameron himself is a part.  
 
In a global race, can we really justify the huge number of expensive peripheral European 
institutions? Can we justify a commission that gets ever larger? Can we carry on with an 
organisation that has a multibillion pound budget but not enough focus on controlling 
spending and shutting down programmes that haven't worked?  
 
(5, italics mine) 
 
He is clearly talking about the EU, but interestingly also makes distinctions between which part of 
the EU decision-making he is a member of.  
 
I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals with the US, Japan and India as 
part of the drive towards global free trade. And I want us to be pushing to exempt Europe's 
smallest entrepreneurial companies from more EU directives. 
 
These should be the tasks that get European officials up in the morning – and keep them 
working late into the night. And so we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective 
decision-making that is holding us back. 
 
(5, italics mine) 
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Despite identifying as a part of the European Union’s decision-makers, Cameron still maintains 
some distance between himself and “European officials”. The implication here is once again that 
the EU is slow and inflexible due to its officials not trying hard enough, or being too wrapped up in 
bureaucracy to achieve a flexible, compact union that does not interfere too much in the affairs of 
its members.  
Cameron uses repetition to get his point across, this time in a more positive fashion, in order 
to forge unity and identification between himself and other EU-actors:  
 
Let's welcome that diversity, instead of trying to snuff it out. Let's stop all this talk of two-
speed Europe, of fast lanes and slow lanes, of countries missing trains and buses, and 
consign the whole weary caravan of metaphors to a permanent siding. Instead, let's start 
from this proposition: we are a family of democratic nations, all members of one European 
Union, whose essential foundation is the single market rather than the single currency.  
 
(6, italics mine) 
 
Cameron’s demonstration of his good will towards his audience manifests in his enthusiastic and 
positive advocacy for collective action. This however, comes after several paragraphs of criticizing 
the EU for being inefficient and holding Britain back. Attempts to use the metaphor of a family to 
get other member states to agree to Cameron’s reforms may therefore not be enough.  
The use of the first-person plural “we” varies throughout the speech. Sometimes it is used to 
refer to the British, sometimes to the EU. Cameron is explicitly identifying himself as a member of 
both groups. He is a part of both of the invoked audiences of the speech, and he uses the pronoun to 
align himself with each group, to strengthen his argument through identification. However, while 
this technique can help the rhetor to forge a connection between himself and the audience, in 
Cameron’s case, this is more complicated as he constantly fluctuates between the two groups. 
After spending several paragraphs aligning himself with the EU (using “we” to refer to the 
Union), Cameron then talks about the British disillusionment with the EU. Here, in a direct contrast 
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to page 2, where he talks about Britain’s attitude to European integration with “we” to indicate that 
he shares the point of view about Britain being an island nation (again this could be to strengthen its 
effectiveness as a “constraint”), Cameron uses “they” to refer to the British public:  
 
Today, public disillusionment with the EU is at an all-time high. There are several reasons 
for this. People feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they never signed up to. They 
resent the interference in our national life by what they see as unnecessary rules and 
regulation. And they wonder what the point of it all is. Put simply, many ask “why can't we 
just have what we voted to join – a common market? They are angered by some legal 
judgements made in Europe that impact on life in Britain” […]  
 
They see treaty after treaty changing the balance between member states and the EU. And 
note they were never given a say. They've had referendums promised – but not delivered. 
They see what has happened to the euro. And they note that many of our political and 
business leaders urged Britain to join at the time. And they haven't noticed many expressions 
of contrition. And they look at the steps the eurozone is taking and wonder what deeper 
integration for the eurozone will mean for a country which is not going to join the euro. The 
result is that democratic consent for the EU in Britain is now wafer-thin.  
 
(8-9, italics mine) 
 
This section is curious as Cameron distances himself from these opinions with the use of “they” as 
opposed to “we”, but the intention of these phrases is to argue his point about the necessity of 
reform, and to imply that is such reform does not happen, the British people will continue to dislike 
and distrust the EU. By using “they” to refer to the dissatisfied Brits, Cameron indicates that he 
personally may not share these views, but that a sizeable portion of his countrymen and –women do. 
This is a narrative that lays the blame for British discontent solely on the doorstep of the EU, and 
argues that if the Union changes and Cameron’s reforms are enacted, Britain will be much more 
comfortable with its membership. It is an appeal to an audience of EU-leaders to convince them of 
the dangers of not heading Cameron’s words about the need of reform. Despite the distance created 
between Cameron and the Eurosceptic Brits with the use of “they”, this passage is also meant to 
indicate to the British audience that Cameron understands their concerns and is willing to fight for 
their rights.  
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After announcing that he will hold a referendum if re-elected in the General Election of 
2015, Cameron begins to address the British public directly: 
 
It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in 
British politics. I say to the British people: this will be your decision. And when that choice 
comes, you will have an important choice to make about our country's destiny. 
 
(11, italics mine)  
 
These phrases are the beginning of the section where Cameron lays down the argument for why 
Britain should remain a member of the EU. This argumentation is discussed in greater depth in 
chapter 3.5. When talking about the potential referendum and how the British should vote in it, 
Cameron uses the phrase “weigh up (very) carefully” or “think (very) carefully” four times in the 
span of a handful of sentences (11-12). Cameron lists all the ways in which Britain benefits from its 
membership of the EU while reminding the British people to think carefully about what is in their 
country’s best interest. The point that is rather forcefully put here is that to vote to leave the EU 
would be a careless thing to do.  
Cameron also makes his last direct plea to the European Union, asking them to go along 
with his reforms in order to prevent a British exit from the EU. What is remarkable is Cameron’s 
thinly veiled threat to the EU-leaders:  
 
And I say to our European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain’s 
attitude: work with us on this. Consider the extraordinary steps which the Eurozone 
members are taking to keep the euro together, steps which a year ago would have seemed 
impossible. It does not seem to me that the steps needed to make Britain – and others – more 
comfortable in their relationship in the European Union are inherently so outlandish or 
unreasonable. And just as I believe that Britain should want to remain in the EU so the EU 
should want us to stay. 
 
(Cameron 13, italics mine) 
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The implication here is that if Cameron’s demands are not met, there is a high possibility that 
Britain will leave the EU. Cameron clearly lays out how he would like his audience to act based on 
his words: the EU should enact Cameron’s reforms and the British people should vote to remain in 
the EU.  
The balancing between the two intended audiences, EU and Britain, causes Cameron to have 
to adopt a somewhat schizophrenic approach to whether the UK’s current relationship with the EU 
is good or not. The course that the Union is currently on, is identified by Cameron as a threat to 
Britain’s prosperity and sovereignty. Cameron explicitly states that the situation does not work for 
Britain and makes the country feel uncomfortable about its membership. However, when it comes 
to addressing the British people, Cameron defends the EU as a good and necessary thing for Britain. 
Notice that he does not argue that Britain should remain only if the reforms he suggests are enacted. 
Cameron talks about how within the EU Britain has more power and influence, how the British 
people have the right to work and live in other EU countries, how access to the single market 
benefits Britain’s economy, and so forth. These are things that already exist. By using this type of 
argumentation Cameron almost completely invalidates his own core argument, which is that the EU 
is currently bad for Britain and needs urgent change. What this section reveals quite clearly is that 
the true reason for this speech is not so much a desire to see the EU fundamentally reformed, but to 
appease the growing wave of Euroscepticism in Britain. 
The OT manifests itself mainly in Cameron’s tightrope walk of “head and heart” when 
addressing the British audience. His last caveat to the British electorate includes a hefty dose of 
reality in the form of listing the economic and security benefits of EU-membership. Cameron 
nevertheless recognizes the long-standing traditions of the OT and offers his sympathy to the more 
Eurosceptic Brits: “I understand the appeal of going it alone, of charting our own course. […] Of 
course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so” 
(Cameron 11).  
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Cameron recognizes the weight of the OT and its convolution of British identity with 
Euroscepticism, but does little to dispel the myths associated with it. In fact, he spends most of his 
speech reinforcing them by reiterating many of Margaret Thatcher’s core arguments found in her 
“Bruges” speech. The EU being inefficient and preventing Britain from truly prospering, is a long-
standing argument among those critical of the Union. When we contrast this for example with Tony 
Blair’s Leader’s Speech where he argues to a British audience that Britain is part of Europe and that 
European integration is not a threat to national identity,25, we see that Cameron’s way of addressing 
the British audience is a conscious choice. When talking to the EU decision-makers Cameron 
invokes Britain’s history that ties it to the Continent while at the same time reminding everyone of 
Britain’s pragmatism and commitment to sovereignty. These, as discussed in previous chapters, are 
feature of the OT that have featured heavily in the speeches of Conservative prime ministers in 
particular. Cameron’s address to the British public mixes elements of Major’s “head and heart” 
argument by offering sympathies for those feeling that their identities are threatened, while at the 
same time trying to convince them that the practical thing to do is remain in the EU. 
 
 
3.5. Constraints 
 
 
Constraints are Bitzer’s third and final component of a rhetorical situation. They refer to “persons, 
events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to 
constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (Bitzer 8). Constraints may be things 
like beliefs, attitudes, traditions, interests, motives and so forth that act as limitations to the rhetor 
(8). Bitzer further divides constraints into two categories: those stemming from the rhetor (his 
                                                 
25 Blair’s Leader’s Speech is discussed in chapter 2.4. 
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personal character and style), and those that exist in the situation which may be “operative” (8). 
Keith Grant-Davie notes that to Bitzer, constraints are not just obstacles that stand in the way of the 
rhetor correctly identifying the exigence, but can also function as aids to the rhetor. According to 
Grant-Davie, constraints are things the rhetor “can harness to constrain the audience to take the 
desired action or point of view” (Grant-Davie 272). Grant-Davie further notes that: “The challenge 
for the rhetor is to decide which parts of the context bear on the situation enough to be considered 
constraints, and what to do about them” (273).  
Constraints are very difficult to define as they can theoretically be anything. Grant-Davie 
defines constraints as all factors in the situation excluding the rhetor and the audience (273). But if 
Bitzer counts the rhetor and his persona as potential constraints, and potentially constraining beliefs 
and attitudes are likely to be held by people in the audience, it is difficult to say what exactly 
constitutes a constraint. If everything can potentially either limit or aid the rhetor, then what 
definition could be found? Richard Vatz’s theory offers a helpful point of view. If we consider the 
rhetor to be primarily responsible for creating the rhetorical situation, we can analyse how he uses 
constraints. This chapter looks at how constraints, the most impactful of them being the OT, both 
help and hinder Cameron’s argumentation. 
 
 
3.5.1. “We can no more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English 
Channel.” 
 
 
The idea of British exceptionalism discussed in Chapter 2 can be seen as a constraint on what 
Cameron can say in his speech with regard to Britain’s membership of the EU. However, we see 
how Cameron uses this idea of a certain “reality” to strengthen his own argument.  
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[Our] geography has shaped our psychology. We have the character of an island nation: 
independent, forthright, passionate in defense of our sovereignty. We can no more change 
this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel. And because of this 
sensibility, we come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than 
emotional. 
 
(Cameron 2) 
 
Cameron presents the notion of Britain’s geography determining the attitudes of its people as a 
constraint on what kind of relationship the country can pursue with the EU, evoking the myths 
about British identity in the OT. Cameron argues that Britain has to seek the kinds of reforms that 
he is asking for, because anything else would not be possible due to the constraining beliefs and 
attitudes of the British public. Britain is fundamentally practical and therefore cannot form an 
ideological commitment to an ever-closer union. This is presented by Cameron as fact. 
Previously, I had assigned the category of “constraints” to correspond with Aristotle’s 
logical persuasion (reality proofs), while noting that this division was not perfect. What I meant was 
not so much that Cameron’s use of constraints was logical and rational, but that it was presented as 
being so. The above quote is stated as a fact, yet it is highly selective in its representation of the 
British sentiment, drawing more from a rhetorical tradition of British exceptionalism and the OT, 
rather than factual evidence. After all, as we saw in the Brexit referendum, British public opinion on 
EU membership is quite diverse.  
Throughout his speech Cameron employs the technique of stating as fact that which is 
ultimately his own opinion. It is in no way unique for politicians to elevate their own points of view 
to the level of objective facts, but Cameron differs for example from Tony Blair in the way he 
discussed Britain’s attitude towards the EU. In his speech to the European Parliament in 2005, 
Blair, similarly to Cameron, outlines reforms he would like to see in the Union. However, when 
Blair talks about Britain and the EU, he highlights his own views. He does not once say that this is 
what all of Britain wants. 
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I just say this: if we agreed real progress on economic reform, if we demonstrated real 
seriousness on structural change, then people would perceive reform of macro policy as 
sensible and rational, not a product of fiscal laxity but of commonsense. And we need such 
reform urgently if Europe is to grow. 
 
(Blair “Speech to the European Parliament”) 
 
This may of course be due to the fact that Blair’s and New Labour’s ideas about Britain’s 
relationship with the EU ran counter to the prevailing narrative of outsiderliness. Interestingly, Blair 
also argues that the problems with the EU are not so much to do with the actual institutions but with 
political leadership: with politicians being unable or unwilling to accurately represent the work the 
EU does. Blair mentions the EU Constitution being rejected by the electorate in two Member States, 
stating that: 
 
[It] is not a crisis of political institutions, it is a crisis of political leadership. […] We are 
living through an era of profound upheaval and change. Look at our children and the 
technology they use and the jobs market they face. The world is unrecognisable from that 
we experienced as students 20, 30 years ago. When such change occurs, moderate people 
must give leadership. If they don’t, the extremes gain traction on the political process. 
 
(Blair 2005) 
 
When discussing discontent with the EU among citizens of Member States Cameron lays the blame 
solely on the door of EU institutions and argues that their failures have contributed to an anti-EU 
sentiment. Cameron uses British public opinion about the EU as a way to justify the need of 
reforms. He articulates a growing frustration among people (not just the British, but many citizens 
of EU member states), stating that “the EU is seen as something that is done to people rather than 
acting on their behalf” (Cameron 4). Again, this attitude is presented by Cameron as support for his 
idea of a more flexible union.  
One major real-life constraint, which Bitzer would categorize as “operative”, that affects 
Cameron’s ability to speak about Britain’s relationship with the EU is completely left unaddressed 
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in the “Bloomberg” speech. The EU’s immigration-policy is not mentioned as something in need of 
reform, in fact, Cameron only talks about immigration at the very end of his speech when he is 
listing all the reasons why the UK should remain in the EU. Even then, Cameron only talks about 
the right of British people to “work, live or retire in any other EU country” (Cameron 12). 
Considering how the issue of migration to Britain was a hot-topic during the referendum 
campaign,26 it is curious that Cameron does not demand stricter border-controls or greater ability 
for member states to set limits on the number of immigrants coming from within the EU. These 
issues were at the forefront during the referendum-campaign, and a poll conducted by Lord 
Ashcroft immediately after the referendum revealed that to a third of Leave-voters, controlling 
immigration was the most important reason for their vote (Ashcroft).  
This constraint obviously did not limit what could be said by Cameron, but its absence from 
the speech did perhaps lessen its argumentative power, especially to the British audience. It does, 
however, speak to Bitzer’s theory that there are elements of the situation that are beyond the 
rhetor’s control. Cameron does, like Richard Vatz argues, give salience to certain aspects of the 
“exigence” and blatantly ignores others, but when it comes to constraints and especially how they 
affect the rhetor’s ability to influence an audience, Cameron cannot diminish their impact on the 
discourse, by simply ignoring them. 
In many ways, the entire OT functions as a constraint in the sense that it both limits what 
Cameron can say and allows him to use it as a reason for his specific rhetoric. As we see in the 
speeches of New Labour prime ministers, countering the OT is challenging, but Cameron barely 
tries. He echoes the words of Thatcher and Major, and presents a narrative about Britain’s 
relationship with the EU as an objective fact: Britain is a reluctant member of the EU and this is 
unlikely to chance, so Britain should be freed from the restrictions of the Union and allowed more 
flexibility. Cameron uses the OT as a negotiating tool with the EU-leaders. This can be seen as an 
                                                 
26 The UK Independence Party (UKIP) and its leader Nigel Farage were widely criticized for a referendum campaign 
poster which depicted a queue of refugees with the words “breaking point” on it (Stewart & Mason)  
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example of Keith Grant-Davie’s theory of the rhetor harnessing a perceived constraint and using it 
to persuade the audience (Grant-Davie 272).  
The OT also functions as a hindrance since it works against Cameron when he is arguing for 
why Britain should remain a part of the EU. Cameron has to try to debunk the age-old myths about 
the EU diminishing British freedom and sovereignty, after having spent the last ten pages 
reinforcing those myths.  
In the closing of his speech, Cameron lists all the reasons why it being a member of the EU 
is beneficial to the UK. Interestingly, although he has spent most of his speech underlining the need 
for meaningful reforms, here Cameron talks about the EU as it is, not as it will be after his reforms 
are enacted. He clearly says to the British people that the EU is good for Britain despite spending 
most of his speech listing the numerous things that are wrong with the union and that limit and 
disenfranchise Britain.  
 
We have more power and influence – whether implementing sanctions against Iran or Syria, 
or promoting democracy in Burma – if we can act together. […] Hundreds of thousands of 
British people now take for granted their right to work, live or retire in any other EU 
country. […] Continued access to the single market is vital for British businesses and British 
jobs. […] There is no doubt that we are more powerful in Washington, in Beijing, in Delhi 
because we are a powerful player in the European Union. That matters for British jobs and 
British security. 
 
(Cameron 12) 
 
During these last few paragraphs of his speech, Cameron essentially undermines his earlier point of 
the EU in its current state being detrimental to British prosperity, security, and power. His core 
argument to the British people is that he understands their concerns about the EU and will fight to 
reform the Union, but that voting to leave, even if reforms are not enacted, would be a disaster. 
Cameron is using the language and talking points of the Eurosceptics, even when he is arguing for 
the UK to remain in the EU. Cameron highlights the economic necessity of EU membership after 
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having spent paragraph after paragraph lamenting the strain EU regulations put on British 
prosperity. It is apparent that Cameron sets out to convince the EU of the urgent need for reform, 
while at the same time trying to assure the Eurosceptic elements in the British public (and in the 
Conservative Party) of the necessity of EU –membership for Britain. There are numerous issues, 
beliefs and traditions that that act as constraints in the “Bloomberg” speech. However, it is 
ultimately the incompatibility of two separate and internally confused arguments to two separate 
audiences, which acts as the strongest constraint on Cameron’s persuasiveness.   
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4. Conclusion 
 
 
The rhetorical situation created in David Cameron’s “Bloomberg” speech of January 23, 2013 
draws from a narrative history of British political discourse on the issue of European integration 
(the Outsider Tradition) but is somewhat removed from the immediate political reality surrounding 
the speech. Analysis of Cameron’s speech reveals that the rhetor is very much responsible for the 
kind of situation he creates. The exigence is evoked by him, the rhetor’s persona is crafted by him, 
the audience is invoked and addressed in a specific way by him, and the constraints are either 
harnessed or ignored by him and him alone. This does not mean that the “real” situation has no 
bearing on the speech. After all, the “Bloomberg” speech does not exist in a vacuum, and everyone 
who hears it is aware of the world around it. However, we cannot remove the responsibility of the 
rhetor and assign his failures in persuading the audience to an overbearing “reality”. The issue with 
Cameron’s speech is not that he fails to correctly identify the exigence, as Bitzer would put it, but 
that he fails to address his limitations as a rhetor, fails to take into account the complexity of his 
audience(s), and relies too heavily on the OT which ultimately works against his argument for 
Britain remaining in the EU.  
Cameron’s speech follows the pattern of light Euroscepticism stemming from the OT and 
the political traditions identified by Fontana and Parsons, which have been created and reproduced 
in the speeches of other British prime ministers. Cameron’s speech, excluding his ending plea to the 
British people to vote to remain in the EU, is largely critical of the Union and blames it for British 
discontent. Cameron acknowledges limiting and potentially harmful aspects of the OT, namely the 
island-mentality of Britain, but never explicitly discusses the issues related to conceptions of British 
identity. These key aspects weighing on Britain’s relationship with the EU are never truly addressed 
by Cameron, as they were not by his predecessors.  
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Analysis of Cameron’s rhetoric reveals the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of arguing 
successfully for why EU membership is good for Britain. While there have been attempts to diverge 
from the narrative of outsiderliness, namely by Labour prime ministers Blair and Brown, the OT 
has persisted. Cameron never attempts to challenge the decades-old myths about Britain’s 
relationship with the EU until the very end of his speech. The main issue with Cameron’s speech, 
with regard to its ability to successfully convince the British electorate that they should vote in 
favour of remaining in the Union in the upcoming referendum, is that it presents the EU as a 
necessary evil, something that has to be endured because it is beneficial. This, in a way, is the 
essence of the OT. The OT appeared to make it easier for Britain to accept its taking part in 
European integration despite myths about British identity and history being perceived by many to 
be fundamentally opposed to it.  
When we look at the narrative history of Britain in the EU as presented in Chapter 2, we see 
how emotional the issue of European integration has been in Britain. This is best exemplified by 
John Major’s woman in Cornwall, who expressed a fear shared by many: loss of identity, loss of 
tradition, loss of history. When weighed against this, Cameron’s cold, pragmatic approach focusing 
almost solely on economic matters does not a convincing argument make.  
It is apparent that Cameron’s hoped the outcome of his speech and subsequent negotiations, 
would have been a meaningful reform in the EU, which would have given Britain more freedom 
and flexibility especially in economic matters, followed by a Conservative election victory and a 
majority vote for Remain in the referendum. Cameron’s goal, as expressed in the “Bloomberg” 
speech, was to make Britain more “comfortable” with its relationship with the EU. But when 
considering that the EU has been presented in previous prime ministerial rhetoric as encroaching on 
British sovereignty and threatening its status as a proud, independent island nation, it is hard to see 
how minor changes to trade relations could make a difference. Given the weight of the OT, the 
mythology of British history and identity, and the long-standing Eurosceptic political traditions that 
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have been repeated time and again by public figures across the political spectrum, it is easy to see 
how Cameron’s Remain-campaign with its pragmatic message was destined to fail.  
The OT is about to enter a new phase with Britain leaving the European Union in 2019. 
How the tradition will adapt to the changes brought on by this monumental change is very much up 
in the air. Whether we see a return to a relationship resembling phase 3, which Daddow describes as 
“outsider as rival/saboteur” (Daddow “Interpreting” 74), or whether Britain forges an entirely new 
relationship with the EU remains to be seen. One thing is, however, clear; the tracing of the OT and 
the narrative created by speeches of British prime ministers reveals the discomfort which Britain 
has felt about the issue of European integration. How much of this discomfort has stemmed from 
genuine concerns about the EU, and how much of perception brought on by political rhetoric, is 
difficult to evaluate. David Cameron had hoped that the referendum would “settle this European 
question in British politics” (Cameron 11), but it is apparent that rather than alleviating discomfort, 
the referendum has created more of it.  
Cameron’s legacy will forever be as the prime minister who lost the referendum and whose 
actions ushered in an era of uncertainty and insecurity for the entire European continent. Ultimately, 
however, he is a link in chain of rhetors who have forged the narrative of Britain’s relationship with 
the EU. The EU referendum result is the Outsider Tradition, with its internal conflict and 
unsustainability, coming to a head. The seeds of Brexit have been sown long ago, and now the time 
for harvest has come.  
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6. Appendix 
 
 
Cameron, David. Bloomberg Speech. 23.1.2013 
 
 
 
This morning I want to talk about the future of Europe. 
 
But first, let us remember the past. 
 
Seventy years ago, Europe was being torn apart by its second catastrophic conflict in a generation. 
A war which saw the streets of European cities strewn with rubble. The skies of London lit by 
flames night after night. And millions dead across the world in the battle for peace and liberty. 
 
As we remember their sacrifice, so we should also remember how the shift in Europe from war to 
sustained peace came about. It did not happen like a change in the weather. It happened because of 
determined work over generations. A commitment to friendship and a resolve never to revisit that 
dark past – a commitment epitomised by the Elysee treaty signed 50 years ago this week. 
 
After the Berlin Wall came down I visited that city and I will never forget it. 
 
The abandoned checkpoints. The sense of excitement about the future. The knowledge that a great 
continent was coming together. Healing those wounds of our history is the central story of the 
European Union. 
 
What Churchill described as the twin marauders of war and tyranny have been almost entirely 
banished from our continent. Today, hundreds of millions dwell in freedom, from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic, from the Western Approaches to the Aegean. 
 
And while we must never take this for granted, the first purpose of the European Union – to secure 
peace – has been achieved and we should pay tribute to all those in the EU, alongside Nato, who 
made that happen. 
 
But today the main, overriding purpose of the European Union is different: not to win peace, but to 
secure prosperity. 
 
The challenges come not from within this continent but outside it. From the surging economies in 
the east and south. Of course a growing world economy benefits us all, but we should be in no 
doubt that a new global race of nations is under way today. 
 
A race for the wealth and jobs of the future. 
 
The map of global influence is changing before our eyes. And these changes are already being felt 
by the entrepreneur in the Netherlands, the worker in Germany, the family in Britain. 
 
2 
 
Deliver Prosperity, Retain Support 
 
 
So I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about the European Union and how it 
must change – both to deliver prosperity and to retain the support of its peoples. 
 
But first, I want to set out the spirit in which I approach these issues. 
 
I know that the United Kingdom is sometimes seen as an argumentative and rather strong-minded 
member of the family of European nations. 
 
And it's true that our geography has shaped our psychology. 
 
We have the character of an island nation: independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our 
sovereignty. 
 
We can no more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel. 
 
And because of this sensibility, we come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more 
practical than emotional. 
 
For us, the European Union is a means to an end – prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and 
democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores – not an end in itself. 
 
We insistently ask: how, why, to what end? 
 
But all this doesn't make us somehow un-European. 
 
The fact is that ours is not just an island story – it is also a continental story. 
 
For all our connections to the rest of the world – of which we are rightly proud – we have always 
been a European power, and we always will be. 
 
From Caesar's legions to the Napoleonic wars. From the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the 
industrial revolution to the defeat of nazism. We have helped to write European history, and Europe 
has helped write ours. 
 
Over the years, Britain has made her own, unique contribution to Europe. We have provided a 
haven to those fleeing tyranny and persecution. And in Europe's darkest hour, we helped keep the 
flame of liberty alight. Across the continent, in silent cemeteries, lie the hundreds of thousands of 
British servicemen who gave their lives for Europe's freedom. 
 
In more recent decades, we have played our part in tearing down the iron curtain and championing 
the entry into the EU of those countries that lost so many years to Communism. And contained in 
this history is the crucial point about Britain, our national character, our attitude to Europe. 
 
Britain is characterised not just by its independence but, above all, by its openness. 
We have always been a country that reaches out. That turns its face to the world. That leads the 
charge in the fight for global trade and against protectionism. 
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This is Britain today, as it's always been: independent, yes – but open, too. 
 
I never want us to pull up the drawbridge and retreat from the world. 
 
I am not a British isolationist. 
 
I don't just want a better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too. 
 
So I speak as British prime minister with a positive vision for the future of the European Union. A 
future in which Britain wants, and should want, to play a committed and active part. 
 
Some might then ask: why raise fundamental questions about the future of Europe when Europe is 
already in the midst of a deep crisis? 
 
Why raise questions about Britain's role when support in Britain is already so thin. 
 
There are always voices saying: "Don't ask the difficult questions." 
 
 
 
3 Major Challenges 
 
 
But it's essential for Europe – and for Britain – that we do because there are three major challenges 
confronting us today. 
 
First, the problems in the eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe. 
 
Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead. 
And third, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent 
years. And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent that is – yes – felt 
particularly acutely in Britain. 
 
If we don't address these challenges, the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people will 
drift towards the exit. 
 
I do not want that to happen. I want the European Union to be a success. And I want a relationship 
between Britain and the EU that keeps us in it. 
 
That is why I am here today: to acknowledge the nature of the challenges we face. To set out how I 
believe the European Union should respond to them. And to explain what I want to achieve for 
Britain and its place within the European Union. 
 
Let me start with the nature of the challenges we face. 
 
First, the eurozone. 
 
The future shape of Europe is being forged. There are some serious questions that will define the 
future of the European Union – and the future of every country within it. 
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The union is changing to help fix the currency – and that has profound implications for all of us, 
whether we are in the single currency or not. 
 
Britain is not in the single currency, and we're not going to be. But we all need the eurozone to have 
the right governance and structures to secure a successful currency for the long term. 
 
And those of us outside the eurozone also need certain safeguards to ensure, for example, that our 
access to the single market is not in any way compromised. 
 
And it's right we begin to address these issues now. 
 
Second, while there are some countries within the EU which are doing pretty well. Taken as a 
whole, Europe's share of world output is projected to fall by almost a third in the next two decades. 
This is the competitiveness challenge – and much of our weakness in meeting it is self-inflicted. 
 
Complex rules restricting our labour markets are not some naturally occurring phenomenon. Just as 
excessive regulation is not some external plague that's been visited on our businesses. 
 
These problems have been around too long. And the progress in dealing with them, far too slow. 
 
As Chancellor Merkel has said, if Europe today accounts for just over 7% of the world's population, 
produces around 25% of global GDP and has to finance 50% of global social spending, then it's 
obvious that it will have to work very hard to maintain its prosperity and way of life. 
 
Third, there is a growing frustration that the EU is seen as something that is done to people rather 
than acting on their behalf. And this is being intensified by the very solutions required to resolve the 
economic problems. 
 
People are increasingly frustrated that decisions taken further and further away from them mean 
their living standards are slashed through enforced austerity or their taxes are used to bail out 
governments on the other side of the continent. 
 
We are starting to see this in the demonstrations on the streets of Athens, Madrid and Rome. We are 
seeing it in the parliaments of Berlin, Helsinki and the Hague. 
 
And yes, of course, we are seeing this frustration with the EU very dramatically in Britain. 
 
Europe's leaders have a duty to hear these concerns. Indeed, we have a duty to act on them. And not 
just to fix the problems in the eurozone. 
 
For just as in any emergency you should plan for the aftermath as well as dealing with the present 
crisis, so too in the midst of the present challenges we should plan for the future, and what the 
world will look like when the difficulties in the eurozone have been overcome. 
 
The biggest danger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate change, but from 
those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has experience of heretics 
who turned out to have a point. 
 
And my point is this. More of the same will not secure a long-term future for the eurozone. More of 
the same will not see the European Union keeping pace with the new powerhouse economies. More 
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of the same will not bring the European Union any closer to its citizens. More of the same will just 
produce more of the same: less competitiveness, less growth, fewer jobs. 
 
And that will make our countries weaker not stronger. 
 
That is why we need fundamental, far-reaching change. 
 
 
 
21st Century European Union 
 
 
So let me set out my vision for a new European Union, fit for the 21st century. 
 
It is built on five principles. 
 
The first: competitiveness. At the core of the European Union must be, as it is now, the single 
market. Britain is at the heart of that single market, and must remain so. 
 
But when the single market remains incomplete in services, energy and digital – the very sectors 
that are the engines of a modern economy – it is only half the success it could be. 
 
It is nonsense that people shopping online in some parts of Europe are unable to access the best 
deals because of where they live. I want completing the single market to be our driving mission. 
 
I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals with the US, Japan and India as part of 
the drive towards global free trade. And I want us to be pushing to exempt Europe's smallest 
entrepreneurial companies from more EU directives. 
 
These should be the tasks that get European officials up in the morning – and keep them working 
late into the night. And so we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision-making 
that is holding us back. 
 
That means creating a leaner, less bureaucratic union, relentlessly focused on helping its member 
countries to compete. 
 
In a global race, can we really justify the huge number of expensive peripheral European 
institutions? 
Can we justify a commission that gets ever larger? 
 
Can we carry on with an organisation that has a multibillion pound budget but not enough focus on 
controlling spending and shutting down programmes that haven't worked? 
 
And I would ask: when the competitiveness of the single market is so important, why is there an 
environment council, a transport council, an education council but not a single market council? 
 
The second principle should be flexibility. 
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We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members – north, south, east, west, 
large, small, old and new. Some of whom are contemplating much closer economic and political 
integration. And many others, including Britain, who would never embrace that goal. 
 
I accept, of course, that for the single market to function we need a common set of rules and a way 
of enforcing them. But we also need to be able to respond quickly to the latest developments and 
trends. 
 
Competitiveness demands flexibility, choice and openness – or Europe will fetch up in a no-man's 
land between the rising economies of Asia and market-driven North America. 
 
The EU must be able to act with the speed and flexibility of a network, not the cumbersome rigidity 
of a bloc. 
 
We must not be weighed down by an insistence on a one size fits all approach which implies that all 
countries want the same level of integration. The fact is that they don't and we shouldn't assert that 
they do. 
 
Some will claim that this offends a central tenet of the EU's founding philosophy. I say it merely 
reflects the reality of the European Union today. 17 members are part of the eurozone. 10 are not. 
 
26 European countries are members of Schengen – including four outside the European Union – 
Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Two EU countries – Britain and Ireland – have 
retained their border controls. 
 
Some members, like Britain and France, are ready, willing and able to take action in Libya or Mali. 
Others are uncomfortable with the use of military force. 
 
Let's welcome that diversity, instead of trying to snuff it out. 
 
Let's stop all this talk of two-speed Europe, of fast lanes and slow lanes, of countries missing trains 
and buses, and consign the whole weary caravan of metaphors to a permanent siding. 
 
Instead, let's start from this proposition: we are a family of democratic nations, all members of one 
European Union, whose essential foundation is the single market rather than the single currency. 
Those of us outside the euro recognise that those in it are likely to need to make some big 
institutional changes. 
 
By the same token, the members of the eurozone should accept that we, and indeed all member 
states, will have changes that we need to safeguard our interests and strengthen democratic 
legitimacy. And we should be able to make these changes too. 
 
Some say this will unravel the principle of the EU – and that you can't pick and choose on the basis 
of what your nation needs. 
 
But far from unravelling the EU, this will in fact bind its members more closely because such 
flexible, willing co-operation is a much stronger glue than compulsion from the centre. 
 
Let me make a further heretical proposition. 
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The European treaty commits the member states to "lay the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe". 
 
This has been consistently interpreted as applying not to the peoples but rather to the states and 
institutions compounded by a European court of justice that has consistently supported greater 
centralisation. 
 
We understand and respect the right of others to maintain their commitment to this goal. But for 
Britain – and perhaps for others – it is not the objective. 
 
And we would be much more comfortable if the treaty specifically said so, freeing those who want 
to go further, faster, to do so, without being held back by the others. 
 
So to those who say we have no vision for Europe, I say we have. 
 
 
Flexible Union 
 
 
We believe in a flexible union of free member states who share treaties and institutions and pursue 
together the ideal of co-operation. To represent and promote the values of European civilisation in 
the world. To advance our shared interests by using our collective power to open markets. And to 
build a strong economic base across the whole of Europe. 
 
And we believe in our nations working together to protect the security and diversity of our energy 
supplies. To tackle climate change and global poverty. To work together against terrorism and 
organised crime. And to continue to welcome new countries into the EU. 
 
This vision of flexibility and co-operation is not the same as those who want to build an ever closer 
political union – but it is just as valid. 
 
My third principle is that power must be able to flow back to member states, not just away from 
them. This was promised by European leaders at Laeken a decade ago. 
 
It was put in the treaty. But the promise has never really been fulfilled. We need to implement this 
principle properly. 
 
So let us use this moment, as the Dutch prime minister has recently suggested, to examine 
thoroughly what the EU as a whole should do and should stop doing. 
 
In Britain we have already launched our balance of competences review – to give us an informed 
and objective analysis of where the EU helps and where it hampers. 
 
Let us not be misled by the fallacy that a deep and workable single market requires everything to be 
harmonised, to hanker after some unattainable and infinitely level playing field. 
 
Countries are different. They make different choices. We cannot harmonise everything. For 
example, it is neither right nor necessary to claim that the integrity of the single market, or full 
membership of the European Union requires the working hours of British hospital doctors to be set 
in Brussels irrespective of the views of British parliamentarians and practitioners. 
8 
 
 
In the same way we need to examine whether the balance is right in so many areas where the 
European Union has legislated including on the environment, social affairs and crime. 
 
Nothing should be off the table. 
 
My fourth principle is democratic accountability: we need to have a bigger and more significant 
role for national parliaments. 
 
There is not, in my view, a single European demos. 
 
It is national parliaments, which are, and will remain, the true source of real democratic legitimacy 
and accountability in the EU. 
 
It is to the Bundestag that Angela Merkel has to answer. It is through the Greek parliament that 
Antonis Samaras has to pass his government's austerity measures. 
 
It is to the British parliament that I must account on the EU budget negotiations, or on the 
safeguarding of our place in the single market. 
 
Those are the parliaments which instil proper respect – even fear – into national leaders. 
 
We need to recognise that in the way the EU does business. 
 
My fifth principle is fairness: whatever new arrangements are enacted for the eurozone, they must 
work fairly for those inside it and out. 
 
That will be of particular importance to Britain. As I have said, we will not join the single currency. 
But there is no overwhelming economic reason why the single currency and the single market 
should share the same boundary, any more than the single market and Schengen. 
 
Our participation in the single market, and our ability to help set its rules is the principal reason for 
our membership of the EU. 
 
So it is a vital interest for us to protect the integrity and fairness of the single market for all its 
members. 
 
And that is why Britain has been so concerned to promote and defend the single market as the 
eurozone crisis rewrites the rules on fiscal co-ordination and banking union. 
 
These five principles provide what, I believe, is the right approach for the European Union. 
 
So now let me turn to what this means for Britain. 
 
Today, public disillusionment with the EU is at an all-time high. There are several reasons for this. 
 
People feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they never signed up to. They resent the 
interference in our national life by what they see as unnecessary rules and regulation. And they 
wonder what the point of it all is. 
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Put simply, many ask "why can't we just have what we voted to join – a common market?" 
 
They are angered by some legal judgements made in Europe that impact on life in Britain. Some of 
this antipathy about Europe in general really relates of course to the European court of human 
rights, rather than the EU. And Britain is leading European efforts to address this. 
 
There is, indeed, much more that needs to be done on this front. But people also feel that the EU is 
now heading for a level of political integration that is far outside Britain's comfort zone. 
 
They see treaty after treaty changing the balance between member states and the EU. And note they 
were never given a say. 
 
They've had referendums promised – but not delivered. They see what has happened to the euro. 
And they note that many of our political and business leaders urged Britain to join at the time. 
 
And they haven't noticed many expressions of contrition. 
 
And they look at the steps the eurozone is taking and wonder what deeper integration for the 
eurozone will mean for a country which is not going to join the euro. 
 
The result is that democratic consent for the EU in Britain is now wafer-thin. 
 
Some people say that to point this out is irresponsible, creates uncertainty for business and puts a 
question mark over Britain's place in the European Union. 
 
But the question mark is already there and ignoring it won't make it go away. 
 
In fact, quite the reverse. Those who refuse to contemplate consulting the British people, would in 
my view make more likely our eventual exit. 
 
Simply asking the British people to carry on accepting a European settlement over which they have 
had little choice is a path to ensuring that when the question is finally put – and at some stage it will 
have to be – it is much more likely that the British people will reject the EU. 
 
That is why I am in favour of a referendum. I believe in confronting this issue – shaping it, leading 
the debate. Not simply hoping a difficult situation will go away. 
 
Some argue that the solution is therefore to hold a straight in-out referendum now. 
 
I understand the impatience of wanting to make that choice immediately. 
 
But I don't believe that to make a decision at this moment is the right way forward, either for Britain 
or for Europe as a whole. 
 
A vote today between the status quo and leaving would be an entirely false choice. 
 
Now – while the EU is in flux, and when we don't know what the future holds and what sort of EU 
will emerge from this crisis – is not the right time to make such a momentous decision about the 
future of our country. 
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It is wrong to ask people whether to stay or go before we have had a chance to put the relationship 
right. 
 
How can we sensibly answer the question "in or out" without being able to answer the most basic 
question: "What is it exactly that we are choosing to be in or out of?" 
 
The European Union that emerges from the eurozone crisis is going to be a very different body. It 
will be transformed perhaps beyond recognition by the measures needed to save the eurozone. 
 
We need to allow some time for that to happen – and help to shape the future of the European 
Union, so that when the choice comes it will be a real one. 
 
 
Real Choice 
 
 
A real choice between leaving or being part of a new settlement in which Britain shapes and 
respects the rules of the single market but is protected by fair safeguards, and free of the spurious 
regulation which damages Europe's competitiveness. 
 
A choice between leaving or being part of a new settlement in which Britain is at the forefront of 
collective action on issues like foreign policy and trade and where we leave the door firmly open to 
new members. 
 
A new settlement subject to the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national parliaments 
where member states combine in flexible co-operation, respecting national differences not always 
trying to eliminate them and in which we have proved that some powers can in fact be returned to 
member states. 
 
In other words, a settlement which would be entirely in keeping with the mission for an updated 
European Union I have described today. More flexible, more adaptable, more open – fit for the 
challenges of the modern age. 
 
And to those who say a new settlement can't be negotiated, I would say listen to the views of other 
parties in other European countries arguing for powers to flow back to European states. 
 
And look too at what we have achieved already. Ending Britain's obligation to bail out eurozone 
members. Keeping Britain out of the fiscal compact. Launching a process to return some existing 
justice and home affairs powers. Securing protections on banking union. And reforming fisheries 
policy. 
 
So we are starting to shape the reforms we need now. Some will not require treaty change. 
 
But I agree too with what President Barroso and others have said. At some stage in the next few 
years the EU will need to agree on treaty change to make the changes needed for the long-term 
future of the euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that 
we seek. 
 
I believe the best way to do this will be in a new treaty so I add my voice to those who are already 
calling for this. 
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My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire EU, not just for Britain. 
 
But if there is no appetite for a new treaty for us all then of course Britain should be ready to 
address the changes we need in a negotiation with our European partners. 
 
The next Conservative manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the British people for a 
Conservative government to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next 
parliament. 
 
It will be a relationship with the single market at its heart. 
 
And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum 
with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms, or come out altogether. 
 
It will be an in-out referendum. 
 
Legislation will be drafted before the next election. And if a Conservative government is elected we 
will introduce the enabling legislation immediately and pass it by the end of that year. And we will 
complete this negotiation and hold this referendum within the first half of the next parliament. 
 
It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in British 
politics. 
 
I say to the British people: this will be your decision. 
 
And when that choice comes, you will have an important choice to make about our country's 
destiny. 
 
I understand the appeal of going it alone, of charting our own course. But it will be a decision we 
will have to take with cool heads. Proponents of both sides of the argument will need to avoid 
exaggerating their claims. 
 
Of course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so. So 
could any other member state. 
 
But the question we will have to ask ourselves is this: is that the very best future for our country? 
 
We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies. 
 
Alone, we would be free to take our own decisions, just as we would be freed of our solemn 
obligation to defend our allies if we left Nato. But we don't leave Nato because it is in our national 
interest to stay and benefit from its collective defence guarantee. 
 
We have more power and influence – whether implementing sanctions against Iran or Syria, or 
promoting democracy in Burma – if we can act together. 
 
If we leave the EU, we cannot of course leave Europe. It will remain for many years our biggest 
market, and forever our geographical neighbourhood. We are tied by a complex web of legal 
commitments. 
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Hundreds of thousands of British people now take for granted their right to work, live or retire in 
any other EU country. 
 
Even if we pulled out completely, decisions made in the EU would continue to have a profound 
effect on our country. But we would have lost all our remaining vetoes and our voice in those 
decisions. 
 
We would need to weigh up very carefully the consequences of no longer being inside the EU and 
its single market, as a full member. 
 
Continued access to the single market is vital for British businesses and British jobs. 
 
Since 2004, Britain has been the destination for one in five of all inward investments into Europe. 
 
And being part of the single market has been key to that success. 
 
There will be plenty of time to test all the arguments thoroughly, in favour and against the 
arrangement we negotiate. But let me just deal with one point we hear a lot about. 
 
There are some who suggest we could turn ourselves into Norway or Switzerland – with access to 
the single market but outside the EU. But would that really be in our best interests? 
 
I admire those countries and they are friends of ours – but they are very different from us. Norway 
sits on the biggest energy reserves in Europe, and has a sovereign wealth fund of over €500bn. And 
while Norway is part of the single market – and pays for the principle – it has no say at all in setting 
its rules. It just has to implement its directives. 
 
The Swiss have to negotiate access to the single market sector by sector, accepting EU rules – over 
which they have no say – or else not getting full access to the single market, including in key 
sectors like financial services. 
 
The fact is that if you join an organisation like the European Union, there are rules. 
 
You will not always get what you want. But that does not mean we should leave – not if the benefits 
of staying and working together are greater. 
 
We would have to think carefully too about the impact on our influence at the top table of 
international affairs. 
 
There is no doubt that we are more powerful in Washington, in Beijing, in Delhi because we are a 
powerful player in the European Union. 
 
That matters for British jobs and British security. 
 
It matters to our ability to get things done in the world. It matters to the United States and other 
friends around the world, which is why many tell us very clearly that they want Britain to remain in 
the EU. 
 
We should think very carefully before giving that position up. 
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If we left the European Union, it would be a one-way ticket, not a return. 
 
So we will have time for a proper, reasoned debate. 
 
At the end of that debate you, the British people, will decide. 
 
And I say to our European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain's attitude: 
work with us on this. 
 
Consider the extraordinary steps which the eurozone members are taking to keep the euro together, 
steps which a year ago would have seemed impossible. 
 
It does not seem to me that the steps which would be needed to make Britain – and others – more 
comfortable in their relationship in the European Union are inherently so outlandish or 
unreasonable. 
 
And just as I believe that Britain should want to remain in the EU so the EU should want us to stay. 
 
For an EU without Britain, without one of Europe's strongest powers, a country which in many 
ways invented the single market, and which brings real heft to Europe's influence on the world 
stage, which plays by the rules and which is a force for liberal economic reform would be a very 
different kind of European Union. 
 
And it is hard to argue that the EU would not be greatly diminished by Britain's departure. 
 
Let me finish today by saying this. 
 
I have no illusions about the scale of the task ahead. 
 
I know there will be those who say the vision I have outlined will be impossible to achieve. That 
there is no way our partners will co-operate. That the British people have set themselves on a path 
to inevitable exit. And that if we aren't comfortable being in the EU after 40 years, we never will be. 
 
But I refuse to take such a defeatist attitude – either for Britain or for Europe. 
 
Because with courage and conviction I believe we can deliver a more flexible, adaptable and open 
European Union in which the interests and ambitions of all its members can be met. 
 
With courage and conviction I believe we can achieve a new settlement in which Britain can be 
comfortable and all our countries can thrive. 
 
And when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an arrangement, I 
will campaign for it with all my heart and soul. 
 
Because I believe something very deeply. That Britain's national interest is best served in a flexible, 
adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it. 
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Over the coming weeks, months and years, I will not rest until this debate is won. For the future of 
my country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for 
generations to come. 
 
 
 
 
